Immigration Structuralism: A Return to Form by Rubenstein, David S.
RUBENSTEIN 10.20.2013 (DO NOT DELETE)  10/21/2013 10:40 PM 
 
 
IMMIGRATION STRUCTURALISM: 
A RETURN TO FORM 
DAVID S. RUBENSTEIN∗ 
INTRODUCTION 
At the heart of the “subfederal immigration revolution”1 are two 
core questions. The first is what to do about our “broken” immigration 
system,2 especially regarding an estimated eleven million individuals 
unlawfully present.3 This question ignites impassioned debates on civil 
liberties, the rule of law, the economy, foreign relations, and who “we” 
are (or wish to be) as a nation.4 For now, at least, the only common 
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Ashira Ostrow, and Juliet Stumpf for their invaluable comments and suggestions on earlier 
drafts. Finally, I wish to thank the members of the Duke Journal of Law Constitutional Law and 
Public Policy for their tireless editorial work, as well as Christina Hansen and Taylor 
Concannon for excellent research assistance. 
 1. This moniker refers to the spate of state and local laws directed at unlawful immigrants 
in the past few years. For statistical accounts of the spike in state laws over the past five years, 
see State Laws Related to Immigration and Immigrants, NAT’L CONF. OF STATE LEGISLATURES, 
http://www.ncsl.org/issues-research/immig/state-laws-related-to-immigration-and-immigrants. 
aspx (last updated Feb. 22, 2012) (reporting the introduction of more than 7000 state 
immigration-related bills and the passage of more than 1000 state laws and resolutions). 
 2. See Kevin R. Johnson, Immigration and Civil Rights: State and Local Efforts to Regulate 
Immigration, 46 GA. L. REV. 609, 617 (2012) (noting “[t]he general view that the current U.S. 
immigration system is broken” as a contributing factor of the “enactment of a record number of 
state and local immigration laws”); see also Barack Obama, President, Remarks by the 
President on Comprehensive Immigration Reform (July 1, 2010) (transcript available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-comprehensive-immigration-
reform) (calling for reforms of the “broken” U.S. immigration system). 
 3. See, e.g., Michael Hoefer et al., Office of Immigration Statistics, Policy Directorate, 
Dep’t of Homeland Sec., Estimates of the Unauthorized Immigration Population Residing in 
the United States: January 2011, at 3 (2012) (providing statistical estimates). Estimates of the 
size of the undocumented population vary, in part because it requires the counting of a shadow 
population, but also due to competing conceptions of what it means to be illegally present. 
 4. For a sampling of competing viewpoints from multiple commentators, see Special 
Feature: Immigration, SCOTUSBLOG, http://www.scotusblog.com/category/special-features/ 
immigration (last visited Feb. 27, 2013) (compiling posts from various authors on immigration); 
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denominator is that something should be done.5 This unsatisfying 
consensus invites the revolution’s second core question: which 
institution of government, relative to others, has the power to do 
what.6 Although Congress has the lawmaking power, it has yet to 
meet the demand for immigration reform. Meanwhile, the Federal 
Executive has proven unable or unwilling to effectively enforce the 
statutory law currently in effect.7 Frustrated, and by default, states and 
localities increasingly have sought to “cooperate” in immigration 
enforcement through self-help measures.8 The federal administration, 
however, has generally rebuked these subfederal initiatives and has 
sought to enjoin them on preemption grounds.9 Our unelected 
judiciary has thus been tasked to sort it out, twice by the Supreme 
Court in as many years.10 
 
see also, e.g., Stephen Legomsky, The Making of United States Refugee Policy: Separation of 
Powers in the Post-Cold War Era, 70 WASH. L. REV. 675, 675 (1995) [hereinafter Legomsky, 
The Making of United States Refugee Policy] (“[O]ur immigration policies quite literally define 
who we are as a people and what qualities we admire and disdain in others. Consequently, the 
formulation of immigration policy requires value judgments about the optimal size of our 
population, the composition of our society, and our general economic direction.”). 
 5.  See Hiroshi Motomura, Immigration Outside the Law, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 2037, 2047 
(2008). 
 6. In similar fashion, Hiroshi Motomura describes the dual questions identified here as 
“what” to do and “who” can do it. His approach to answering these questions, however, differs 
in several critical respects from mine. Most notably, he suggests approaching the question of 
“who” with consideration to the question of “what.” See Hiroshi Motomura, The Rights of 
Others: Legal Claims and Immigration Outside the Law, 59 DUKE L.J. 1723, 1728, 1738−46 
(2010) [hereinafter Motomura, The Rights of Others]. But my own view is that these questions 
are legally distinct, should be treated that way, and that distortion of the former by the latter is a 
dangerous (even if principled) means to an end. For further discussion of these points, see infra 
Part IV. 
 7.  See Adam B. Cox, Enforcement Redundancy and the Future of Immigration Law, SUP. 
CT. REV. (forthcoming) (manuscript at 25) [hereinafter Cox, Enforcement Redundancy] 
(suggesting that the Executive’s under-enforcement policies are due to both resource 
constraints and ideological preferences). 
 8. See, e.g., Press Release, Speaker Hubbard Responds to Effort to Overturn New 
Immigration Law (July 8, 2011) (“If the federal government won’t enforce its own laws and 
protect Alabama, we must protect ourselves.”); Press Release, House Vote Sends Immigration 
Bill to Gov’s Desk, SOUTH CAROLINA STATEHOUSE BLOG (Jun. 21, 2011), 
http://sc.statehouseblogs.com/2011/06/21/house-vote-sends-immigration-bill-to-
gov%E2%80%99s-desk-press-release/ (“If Washington refuses to effectively support our law 
enforcement officers by enforcing immigration laws, it is left up to the states to stand up and do 
what is right.”). 
 9. E.g., Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2497 (2012); United States v. Alabama, 
691 F.3d 1269 (11th Cir. 2012); see Adam Cox & Eric Posner, Delegation in Immigration Law, 
79 U. CHI. L. REV. 1285, 1286–87 (2012) (noting the administration’s “nearly unprecedented 
step” of suing to enjoin the states on preemption grounds). 
 10. See, e.g., Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2497 (addressing the United States Justice Department’s 
claim that Arizona’s Support Our Law Enforcement and Safe Neighborhoods Act was 
preempted by federal law); Chamber of Commerce v. Whiting, 131 S. Ct. 1968, 1973 (2011) 
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This presages an unsettling irony. We may be trying to fix a broken 
immigration system with a broken government. If so, perhaps more 
critical attention should be directed at mending our institutional 
structure and political processes. This Article introduces a theory of 
“immigration structuralism” as part of a larger project toward those 
ends. The theory’s major premise, and contribution, is that we should 
consult both separation of powers and federalism norms in addressing 
the subfederal revolution’s core question of relative power.11 This 
approach recognizes the important relationship between our 
structural dimensions and seeks to harness that relationship in 
politically reinforcing ways.12 
Sensitivity to separation of powers is especially vital for assessing 
claims about the preemptive effect of executive enforcement policies. 
Approaches to preemption that sideline the distinction between 
executive policies and congressional statutes incentivize Congress to 
abdicate lawmaking to the Executive, the Executive to usurp 
Congress’s lawmaking role, or both. In turn, these aberrations in the 
lawmaking process undermine the political and procedural 
protections guaranteed to the states in the Constitution.13 My 
suggested approach, by contrast, draws a fundamental distinction 
between legislative and nonbinding executive action, such that only 
the former may trump subfederal law. As will be seen, this approach 
 
(upholding the Ninth Circuit’s determination that Arizona’s Legal Arizona Workers Act of 2007 
was not preempted by federal immigration law). 
 11.  Cf. Cox, Enforcement Redundancy, supra note 7, (manuscript at 2) (observing that 
Arizona v. United States is as much about separation of powers as it is about federalism). 
 12. On the interdimensional relationship between separation of powers and federalism, my 
thinking is indebted to the influential work of Jessica Bulman-Pozen, Federalism as a Safeguard 
of Separation-of-Powers, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 459 (2012); Bradford R. Clark, Separation of 
Powers as a Safeguard of Federalism, 79 TEX. L. REV. 1321 (2001) [hereinafter Clark, Separation 
of Powers]; Brandon P. Denning & Michael D. Ramsey, American Insurance Association v. 
Garamendi and Executive Preemption in Foreign Affairs, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 825 (2004); 
Ernest A. Young, Executive Preemption, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 869 (2008). 
 13. On the political and procedural safeguards, see, for example, Clark, Separation of 
Powers, supra note 12, at 1323–24 (“[F]ederal lawmaking procedures . . . preserve federalism 
both by making federal law more difficult to adopt, and by assigning lawmaking power solely to 
actors subject to the political safeguards of federalism.”); Herbert Wechsler, The Political 
Safeguards of Federalism: The Role of the States in the Composition and Selection of the National 
Government, 54 COLUM. L. REV. 543, 546–58 (1954) (observing that “the national political 
process in the United States—and especially the role of the states in the composition and 
selection of the central government—is intrinsically well adapted to” protecting the states 
against federal intrusion); Ernest A. Young, Two Cheers for Process Federalism, 46 VILL. L. 
REV. 1349, 1362 (2001) [hereinafter Young, Two Cheers] (“Inertia and inefficiency are similar 
tools that play an important role in protecting state autonomy from federal incursions.”). See 
also infra notes 269−71 and accompanying text. 
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better safeguards both federalism and separation of powers. 
To bring these themes into sharp relief, this Article draws from 
two recent examples. The first is the Executive’s Deferred Action for 
Childhood Arrivals (DACA) program, introduced in the summer of 
2012.14 Under the DACA program, unlawfully present immigrants 
who came to the United States at a young age and who meet other 
eligibility criteria may remain and lawfully work here for renewable 
two-year periods.15 DACA is now the target of a lawsuit by certain 
federal immigration agents seeking to enjoin the program on 
separation of powers grounds.16 In particular, the complaint alleges 
that DACA usurps the legislative function and otherwise violates the 
Executive’s constitutional duty to “take Care that the Laws be 
faithfully executed.”17 The federal administration has emphatically 
denied these charges, stressing that DACA does not make “Law” and 
is merely an expression of the Executive’s constitutionally vested 
enforcement discretion.18 
 
 14. Memorandum for David Aguilar, Acting Comm’r, U.S. Customs and Border Prot., 
Alejandro Mayorkas, Dir., U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Servs., and John Morton, Dir., 
U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, from Janet Napolitano, Sec’y of Homeland Sec., 
Re: Exercising Prosecutorial Discretion with Respect to Individuals Who Came to the United 
States as Children (Jun. 15, 2012), available at http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/s1-exercising-
prosecutorial-discretion-individuals-who-came-to-us-as-children.pdf [hereinafter DACA 
Memo]. 
 15. Id. 
 16. Amended Complaint, Crane v. Napolitano, No. 3:12-cv-03247-O (N.D. Tex. Oct. 10, 
2012). Mississippi joined as a plaintiff to the case, but the State’s complaints were dismissed for 
lack of standing. Crane v. Napolitano, No. 3:12-cv-03247-O, 2013 WL 363710 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 24, 
2013). In an interim opinion, the district court found that it was “likely” the remaining plaintiffs 
would be entitled to a preliminary injunction enjoining DACA based on the strength of their 
statutory and Administrative Procedure Act claims. Crane v. Napolitano, 2013 WL 1744422, No. 
3:12-cv-03247-O (N.D. Tex. Apr. 23, 2013). But the court reserved making a final decision, 
pending further briefing from the parties. Id. 
 17. Amended Complaint, Crane v. Napolitano, supra note 16, at 18–20. 
 18. See DACA Memo, supra note 14, at 3 (noting that while the DACA memorandum 
does not confer any substantive rights or a path to citizenship, because that granting authority 
remains with Congress, the Executive Branch holds the power to set policy enforcing existing 
legislation); see also Defendant’s Opposition to Plaintiff’s Application for Preliminary 
Injunctive Relief, Crane v. Napolitano, No. 3:12-cv-03247-O (filed Dec. 19, 2012). The 
administration’s legal position is backed by a letter of support authored by Hiroshi Motomura 
and signed by nearly 100 law professors. See Letter from Hiroshi Motomura, Professor, UCLA 
Sch. of Law, et al. to Barack Obama, President, Executive Authority to Grant Administrative 
Relief for DREAM Act Beneficiaries 1 (May 28, 2012), available at 
www.nilc.org/document.html?id=754 (“[T]here is clear executive authority for several forms of 
administrative relief for [The Development, Relief, and Education for Aliens Minors Act 
(Dream Act)] beneficiaries: deferred action, parole-in-place, and deferred enforced 
departure.”). This letter was sent only days prior to DACA’s unveiling and may have played a 
role in assuaging concerns, earlier expressed by the administration, that only Congress had the 
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My intention here is not to resolve this separation of powers 
issue.19 Rather, I use it only to provide context and contour for my 
theory of immigration structuralism. With that purpose in mind, I 
offer what I believe are unobjectionable yet critical observations 
about the DACA controversy. 
First, along the horizontal dimension, a theoretical division of 
power exists between lawmaking and law execution.20 Article I of the 
Constitution vests “all legislative” power in Congress,21 while Article 
II vests the “executive” power in the President.22 Second, in practice, 
identifying the point at which law execution crosses into lawmaking 
can be an elusive if not impossible task (especially in close cases, 
which DACA may be).23 Third, courts are not institutionally well-
positioned to police that constitutional line and are generally quick to 
 
power to grant the relief requested. Cf. Michael A. Olivas, Dreams Deferred: Deferred Action, 
Prosecutorial Discretion and the Vexing Case(s) of DREAM Act Students, 21 WM. & MARY 
BILL RTS. J. 463, 472–73 (describing the administration’s earlier position on its lack of authority 
to grant DREAM Act-type relief absent congressional action); Lamar Smith, Obama’s Amnesty 
for Illegal Immigrants is Against the Law, CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR (June 15, 2012), 
http://www.csmonitor.com/Commentary/Opinion/2012/0615/Lamar-Smith-Obama-amnesty 
(quoting President Obama in an interview with Univision television on the subject, as stating 
that he could not “waive away the laws that Congress put in place” and that “the president 
doesn’t have the authority to simply ignore Congress and say, ‘[w]e’re not going to enforce the 
laws that you’ve passed’”). 
 19. For recent treatments of DACA’s separation of powers issues, see generally Lauren 
Gilbert, Obama’s Ruby Slippers: Enforcement Discretion in the Absence of Immigration Reform, 
116 W. VA. L. REV. (forthcoming 2013) [hereinafter Gilbert, Obama’s Ruby Slippers]; Jeffrey A. 
Love & Arpit K. Garg, Presidential Inaction and the Separation of Powers, 112 MICH. L. REV. 
(forthcoming 2014); David A. Martin, A Defense of Immigration-Enforcement Discretion: The 
Legal and Policy Flaws in Kris Kobach’s Latest Crusade, 122 YALE L.J. ONLINE 167 (2012); 
Peter Margulies, Taking Care of Immigration Law: Presidential Stewardship, Prosecutorial 
Discretion, and the Separation of Powers, 93 B.U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2013); John Yoo & 
Robert Delahunty, The Obama Administration, the DREAM Act and the Take Care Clause, 91 
TEX. L. REV. (forthcoming 2013). 
 20. See, e.g., Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 587 (1952) 
(invalidating the President’s executive order to seize and operate steel mills because it 
amounted to lawmaking, a power vested solely in Congress); see also supra notes 6, 18 and 
accompanying text. 
 21. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1. 
 22. Id. art. II, § 1. 
 23. See Bradford R. Clark, The Procedural Safeguards of Federalism, 83 NOTRE DAME L. 
REV. 1681, 1702 (2008) [hereinafter Clark, The Procedural Safeguards] (“[T]here is no bright 
line, judicially administrable test for distinguishing (permissible) law execution from 
(impermissible) lawmaking.”). For an argument that DACA crosses the line, and is thus an 
impermissible exercise of executive power, see Yoo & Delahunty, supra note 19. For arguments 
to the contrary, see Gilbert, Obama’s Ruby Slippers, supra note 19, and Love & Garg, supra 
note 19. For an enlightened argument that DACA cannot be justified as an exercise of 
prosecutorial discretion, but is nevertheless sustainable as an act of presidential stewardship, see 
Margulies, supra note 19. 
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reject invitations to do so.24 Accordingly, the theoretical question of 
whether the boundary between lawmaking and law execution has 
been crossed is generally resolved, if at all, through the political 
process alone.25 Fourth—and getting closer to the project at hand—
DACA implicates not only separation of powers but also federalism. 
Specifically, qualifying immigrants are afforded permission to remain 
in the United States and, by default, permission to reside in the states 
and cities of their choosing. Moreover, insofar as DACA beneficiaries 
are granted legal permission to work, this implicates traditional 
subfederal interests in labor and employment. Indeed, aroused by 
these localist concerns, Arizona quickly responded with a 
countermeasure to deny drivers licenses to DACA beneficiaries, thus 
undermining or neutralizing some of DACA’s putative purpose.26 
Other states have taken or threatened similar action.27 Thus, the 
payoff question: can the Executive’s DACA initiative preempt 
conflicting subfederal policy?28 
 
 24. Cf. Reno v. Am.-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm., 525 U.S. 471, 492 (1999) (rejecting 
a claim of selective immigration prosecution and noting the particular difficulties with 
“invad[ing] a special province of the Executive” over its prosecutorial discretion); Heckler v. 
Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 831 (1985) (explaining that an agency’s decision not to prosecute or 
enforce the law is generally committed to the agency’s discretion); see also INS v. Chadha, 462 
U.S. 919, 951 (1983) (noting that “when any branch acts, it is presumptively exercising the 
power the Constitution has delegated to it”). 
 25. See Peter L. Strauss, The President and Choices Not to Enforce, 63 LAW & CONTEMP. 
PROBS. 107, 114 (2000) (explaining that remedies for conflicts between congressional will and 
executive enforcement “lie more often in congressional oversight or the election booth than in 
the courthouse”). 
 26. Ariz. Exec. Order No. 2012-06 (Aug. 15, 2012) (directing state agencies to take 
necessary steps to “prevent [DACA] recipients from obtaining eligibility . . . for any . . . state 
identification, including a driver’s license”). 
 27. Mississippi, like Arizona, has declared DACA beneficiaries ineligible to receive drivers 
licenses. Miss. Exec. Order No. 1299 (Aug. 22, 2012). Last year, Michigan also took the position 
that it would not grant drivers licenses to DACA beneficiaries, but it has recently determined 
that it would. See Niraj Warikoo, Michigan Secretary of State Does U-Turn; Will Grant Driver’s 
Licenses to Qualifying Immigrants, DETROIT FREE PRESS, Feb. 1, 2013. Meanwhile, North 
Carolina has taken a middle-ground approach: granting drivers licenses to DACA beneficiaries, 
but which include the words “no lawful status” directly above the person’s name. See Martha 
Waggoner, NC Abandons Pink Stripe on Immigrant Licenses, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Mar. 21, 
2013), http://news.yahoo.com/nc-abandons-pink-stripes-immigrant-licenses-221544718.html. 
Still, the vast majority of states have expressly indicated that they would grant drivers licenses to 
DACA beneficiaries. See Are Individuals Granted Deferred Action Under the Deferred Action 
for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) Policy Eligible for Driver’s Licenses?, NAT’L IMMIGRATION 
LAW CENTER, available at http://www.nilc.org/dacadriverslicenses.html (last updated Mar. 29, 
2013). 
 28. The American Civil Liberties Union seems to think so, as reflected in its complaint 
against the Arizona licensing program. See Complaint, Arizona Dream Act Coalition v. Brewer, 
No. 2:12-cv-02546 (D. Az. Nov. 29, 2012) (arguing the Governor’s executive order denying 
driver’s licenses to DACA beneficiaries violates the Supremacy Clause); see also Complaint, 
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A second example was showcased in Arizona v. United States,29 
though, I submit, not fully resolved.30 There, the federal administration 
claimed that its enforcement priorities preempted Arizona laws.31 
More specifically, the proffered conflict was between executive 
policies that focus enforcement resources on targeted subclasses of 
unlawfully present immigrants and Arizona’s arrest-and-report laws 
that target a generic and undifferentiated class of undocumented 
immigrants.32 The question again is presented: Can the Executive’s 
enforcement priorities preempt conflicting subfederal initiatives? 
My short answer is that nonbinding executive enforcement 
policies cannot, and should not, preempt subfederal law. For reasons 
elaborated in more detail below, the Supremacy Clause’s text, context, 
and drafting history all point toward limiting the types of preemptive 
federal laws to the Constitution, statutes, and Treaties.33 By negative 
implication, executive enforcement policies—especially insofar as 
they lack the force of law—cannot provide a constitutional basis for 
preempting state law. 
It is structurally paradoxical for the federal administration to 
simultaneously claim that its enforcement policies (1) are not “Law” 
for separation of powers purposes34 (2) but are “Law” for preemption 
purposes.35 To be clear, my purpose here is not to decry political 
hypocrisy. Rather, it is to repel the hypocrisy in constitutional terms. 
 
One Michigan v. Johnson, No. 2:12-15551 (S.D. Ga. Dec. 19, 2012) (seeking to enjoin the 
Michigan Secretary of State policy of denying drivers licenses to DACA beneficiaries on 
preemption and other grounds). Recently, the United States District Court of Arizona held that 
Arizona’s policy of denying drivers licenses to DACA beneficiaries was not preempted, 
dismissing the plaintiffs’ claim. Arizona Dream Act Coalition v. Brewer, No. 2:12-cv-02546, 2013 
WL 2128315 (D. Az. May 16, 2013) (dismissing the plaintiffs’ claim but also holding that the 
plaintiffs’ equal protection challenge to the policy had a likelihood of success). 
 29. 132 S. Ct. 2492 (2012). 
 30. For further discussion on this point, see infra notes 167–68 and accompanying text. 
 31. See, e.g., Brief for the United States at 22, Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492 
(2012) (No. 11-182) (“The framework that the Constitution and Congress has created does not 
permit the States to adopt their own immigration programs and policies or to set themselves up 
as rival decisionmakers based on disagreement with the focus and scope of federal 
enforcement.”); see also infra notes 155−62 and accompanying text. 
 32. See infra notes 161−63 and accompanying text. 
 33. See Clark, The Procedural Safeguards, supra note 23, at 1711–12 (making this claim); 
see also infra notes 65−77 and accompanying text. 
 34.  See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7 (providing that a bill may become “Law” only after 
traversing the requirements of bicameralism and presentment); see also Youngstown Sheet & 
Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 587–88 (1952) (holding that the President has no inherent 
domestic lawmaking authority). 
 35.  See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 (providing that the “Laws” made pursuant to the 
Constitution shall be the “supreme law of the land”). 
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Specifically, if the Executive’s exercise of enforcement discretion 
crosses into lawmaking, then it is void under separation of powers 
principles and thus cannot qualify for preemption. On the other hand, 
if the Executive’s prosecutorial discretion is not a form of lawmaking, 
then it falls beyond the Supremacy Clause’s preemptive scope. To be 
more plain, the Executive cannot have it both ways: its enforcement 
discretion cannot simultaneously be Law and not be Law.36 
This structural paradox—like all good puzzles—begs to be solved. 
A spirited assault is thus expected, especially given the stakes and an 
already deeply invested audience. One “solution,” for example, might 
be to assign different meanings to Law for purposes of separation of 
powers, on the one hand, and for federalism on the other. This 
approach is not obviously wrong.37 Immigration constitutional law is 
littered with peculiarities tied to foreign affairs and sovereignty.38 
Thus, it is at least conceivable that there should be exceptional 
treatment in the immigration context for what qualifies as preemptive 
under the Supremacy Clause, or for what qualifies as law for purposes 
of separation of powers.39 Though this article confronts and rejects 
proposed solutions to the structural paradox, it does so somewhat 
reluctantly. Such forays only detract from my more central message: 
We should not want to unravel the paradox, because it safeguards 
basic structural values. 
Part I of this Article briefly reviews our government structure, its 
component elements of separation of powers and federalism, their 
interrelatedness, and the liberty-securing values they serve. Part II 
offers an account of how separation of powers norms are seriously 
threatened in immigration and explains how these potential failings 
impact immigration federalism. Part III expounds upon the theory of 
 
 36. To be sure, the power of prosecutorial discretion is impliedly vested in the Executive. 
But the power of preemption is not. Thus, while the Executive can set enforcement policies, 
those policies cannot themselves provide a basis for preempting state law. See infra notes 69−77, 
235–50 and accompanying text. Rather, in the face of a conflict, the federal and state law should 
operate concurrently, unless and until the latter is preempted by Congress. 
 37.  Cf. Cox, Enforcement Redundancy, supra note 7, (manuscript at 22–26) (observing that 
the question of executive enforcement preemption hinges on competing conceptions of law, and 
that the Court’s conception of immigration law to include executive enforcement is 
exceptional). 
 38. See infra notes 93−97, 129−34 and accompanying text. 
 39. Outside the immigration context, the Court has sent mixed signals. Compare Am. Ins. 
Ass’n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 401 (2003) (holding that a foreign affairs policy reflected in 
an executive agreement preempted state law), with Barclays Bank PLC v. Franchise Tax Bd., 
512 U.S. 298, 303 (1994) (rejecting the claim that nonbinding executive foreign-commerce 
policies preempted state law). 
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immigration structuralism. Among other things, it analyzes and 
contrasts two competing models for approaching the question of 
which government institution has the relative power to do what. The 
conventional model seems to treat potential failings along the 
horizontal separation of powers dimension as an inertial push for 
further concessions along the vertical federalism dimension. That 
approach seems doctrinally precarious. Under the alternative model 
that I propose, constitutional capitulations along one dimension 
should cause us to insist upon maintaining—if not invigorating—the 
prophylactic protections secured by the other. Stated otherwise, 
possible failings in our structural norms should counsel for 
reinvestment in first principles, not for their further abandonment. 
Part IV anticipates some likely resistance to my approach. The 
principal objection may be that it puts too much hope in the Framers’ 
original strategies for securing liberty. Stated differently, perhaps my 
approach improvidently elevates form over substance. As will be seen, 
this objection harkens to the political question of what to do about 
immigration. A great many view the subfederal restrictionist laws as 
unethical, impracticable, and distasteful—quite apart from a 
supporting portfolio of legal objections.40 Seen in this light, I am 
certainly sensitive to arguments favoring substance over form. I also 
appreciate that answers to the constitutional question of which, can 
have practical implications for the political outcomes of what. 
As I hope to demonstrate, however, a consequentialist approach 
to the question of what to do about immigration should not distort or 
substitute for the separate question of which institution has the power 
to do it. It is one thing to invest political faith in the federal 
government over the question of what; yet it is quite another to invest 
in judicial doctrines that serve to entrench an undifferentiated and 
exclusive federal power over the question of which. 
Indeed, the push of many of my colleagues toward federal 
monopolization in the name of immigrant rights may prove self-
defeating. To begin with, federal monopolization would hamstring 
 
 40. Several lawsuits have challenged subfederal laws not only on preemption grounds, but 
also based on alleged violations of Equal Protection rights, the First Amendment right to speech 
and association, and the Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches and 
seizures. See, e.g., Hispanic Interest Coal. v. Bentley, 691 F.3d 1236 (11th Cir. 2012); Ga. Latino 
Alliance for Human Rights v. Deal, 793 F. Supp. 2d 1317, 1321 (N.D. Ga. 2011); Complaint, 
Valle del Sol v. Whiting, No. CV 10-1061 (D. Ariz. May 17, 2012). See also infra notes 330−32 
and accompanying text. 
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subfederal initiatives that afford more rights and protection than 
federal law requires.41 Of more pressing concern, however, the federal 
political branches have not yet settled on a solution to the 
immigration problem. If they do so unfavorably to immigrants—a not 
unlikely scenario given the current trends42—what checks will remain? 
Certainly, the check will not come from the Judiciary, which has 
abdicated meaningful review of political choices concerning 
immigration under the infamous plenary doctrine.43 Nor would the 
check come from subfederal governments, since a federal monopoly 
will leave states and localities nothing to offer. 
I. SEPARATION OF POWERS, FEDERALISM, AND THEIR 
INTERRELATIONSHIP 
Our government was formed in the shadow of failed experiences. 
The inefficiencies and collective-action problems beset under the 
Articles of Confederation called for empowering a centralized, 
federal, government.44 At the same time, however, the despotism 
sustained under British rule cautioned for limiting government 
power.45 
 
 
 
 41. For example, some subfederal governments provide welfare benefits that federal law 
does not require, allow day-labor centers for unauthorized workers, offer in-state tuition to 
unauthorized immigrants, grant them drivers licenses or other forms of identification, and resist 
cooperating with federal immigration enforcement. See, e.g., Cristina M. Rodriguez, The 
Significance of the Local in Immigration Regulation, 106 MICH. L. REV. 567, 582–90 (2008) 
[hereinafter Rodriguez, The Significance of the Local] (discussing these protectionist programs). 
 42. See infra note 343 and accompanying text. 
 43. See infra notes 83, 88, 231 and accompanying text. 
 44. See, e.g., Robert D. Cooter & Neil S. Siegel, Collective Action Federalism: A General 
Theory of Article I, Section 8, 63 STAN. L. REV. 115, 117 (2010) (“The solution [to failures 
stemming from the inability of the states to cooperate] lay with the establishment of a more 
comprehensive unit of government—a national government . . . .”); see also JAMES W. ELY, JR., 
THE GUARDIAN OF EVERY OTHER RIGHT 31 (1998) (explaining the Framers’ support for a 
“more vigorous national government that could protect property rights, promote commerce, 
establish credit by paying the public debt, and suppress insurrection”). 
 45. See, e.g., ELY, supra note 44, at 26–31 (identifying colonial British rule as the impetus 
for the American revolutionaries’ emphasis on protection of property ownership in 
constitutional limits on government power); Rebecca Brown, Separated Powers and Ordered 
Liberty, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 1513, 1513–16 (1991) (raising James Madison’s warning that the 
accumulation of all governmental powers in one body is the very definition of tyranny); 
Lawrence Lessig & Cass Sunstein, The President and the Administration, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 
13 (1994) (“It is an important truism that the framers were quite skeptical of broad executive 
authority, a notion that they associated with the tyrannical power of the King.”). 
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The Constitution’s original strategy for repelling tyranny was 
structural: Power was dispersed horizontally among the federal 
branches (i.e., separation of powers) and vertically between the 
federal and state governments (i.e., federalism). In the Federalist 
Papers, James Madison famously professed that, together, these 
structural elements would net a “double security” for liberty.46 In mind 
was a brand of liberty that advanced not only individual autonomy 
but also political choice.47 Though the Bill of Rights was later directed 
at promoting these values, the structural division of power offered 
independent prophylactic security.48 It was a strategy born of two 
related concerns: first, that incremental threats to liberty might prove 
too difficult to discern in individual cases; and second, that 
government power, once accumulated, might prove too difficult to 
counter.49 
Towards these ends, the Constitution divides and vests the federal 
power in three separate institutions: the legislative power in Congress 
(which is further subdivided into two houses);50 the executive power 
in the President;51 and the judicial power in the courts.52 This division 
of federal power was designed to secure liberty, in part, by diffusing 
the political influence of private, self-regarding interests.53 “A faction 
might come to dominate one branch, but it was unlikely to acquire 
power over all three.”54 To be sure, separating power horizontally was 
 
 46. THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, at 323 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (stating 
that “a double security arises to the rights of the people” because “[i]n the compound republic 
of America, the power surrendered by the people is first divided between two distinct 
governments, and then the portion allotted to each subdivided among distinct and separate 
departments”). As Montesquieu wrote: “When the legislative and Executive power are united 
in the same person, or in the same body of magistrates, there can be no liberty.” BARON DE 
MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF LAWS 151 (1748) (Prometheus ed., 2002). 
 47. Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417, 450 (1998) (Kennedy, J., concurring); Lynn 
A. Baker & Ernest A. Young, Federalism and the Double Standard of Judicial Review, 51 DUKE 
L.J. 75, 135 (2001). 
 48. Martin H. Redish & Elizabeth J. Cisar, “If Angels Were to Govern”: The Need for 
Pragmatic Formalism in Separation of Powers Cases, 41 DUKE L.J. 449, 477 (1991) (discussing 
the purposes of prophylactic protections). 
 49. Id.; see also Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 640 (1952) 
(Jackson, J., concurring) (“The purpose of the Constitution was not only to grant power, but to 
keep it from getting out of hand.”). 
 50. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1. 
 51. Id. art. II, § 1. 
 52. Id. art. III, § 1. 
 53. Cass R. Sunstein, Constitutionalism After the New Deal, 101 HARV. L. REV. 421, 434–36 
(1987). 
 54. Id. 
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expected to result in some government inefficiency.55 But the defeat of 
“a few good laws” was thought to be “amply compensated by the 
advantage of preventing a number of bad ones.”56 
Dividing power vertically between the federal and state 
governments similarly was intended to advance the political 
marketplace. Each level of government could be expected to compete 
for public loyalties “by conferring the freedom to choose from among 
various diverse regulatory regimes the one that best suits the 
individual’s preferences.”57 States could garner popular loyalty not 
only from the substance of their laws, but also by affording the public 
more accessible outlets for political choice and participation in 
government.58 As Roderick Hills explains, “federal regimes allow 
groups smaller than a national majority to satisfy their preferences for 
public goods, multiply opportunities for political participation, and 
diffuse power in a way to promote electoral competition.”59 Again, 
though not necessarily efficient, the competition for political favor in 
the states provides a critical check against an otherwise unchallenged 
and potentially overreaching federal government.60 
 
 
 55. THE FEDERALIST NO. 62, at 378 (James Madison) (acknowledging that “check[s] on 
legislation may in some instances be injurious as well as beneficial”). 
 56. THE FEDERALIST NO. 73, at 444 (Alexander Hamilton) (“The injury which may 
possibly be done by defeating a few good laws will be amply compensated by the advantage of 
preventing a number of bad ones.”). 
 57. Baker & Young, supra note 47, at 139; Robert F. Nagel, Federalism as a Fundamental 
Value: National League of Cities in Perspective, 1981 SUP. CT. REV. 81, 100 (“[T]he Federalists 
understood and emphasized that influence through electoral politics presupposes that state 
governments would exist as alternative objects of loyalty to the national government.”). 
 58. THE FEDERALIST NO. 46 (James Madison) (noting that “a greater number of 
individuals will expect to rise” into state government); Young, Two Cheers, supra note 13, at 
1369. 
 59. Roderick M. Hills, Jr., The Political Economy of Cooperative Federalism: Why State 
Sovereignty Makes Sense and “Dual Sovereignty” Doesn’t, 96 MICH. L. REV. 813, 856 n.152 
(1998). 
 60. Young, Two Cheers, supra note 13, at 1369, 1358 n.42 (“States cannot function as 
checks on the power of the central government, or as laboratories of experimental regulation, if 
they lack the institutional ability to govern themselves in meaningful ways.”); see also New York 
v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 181 (1992) (“[F]ederalism secures to citizens the liberties that 
derive from the diffusion of sovereign power.” (quoting Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 
759 (1991) (Blackmun, J., dissenting))); Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 458 (1991) (“Perhaps 
the principal benefit of the federalist system is a check on abuses of government power.”); Akhil 
Reed Amar, Of Sovereignty and Federalism, 96 YALE L.J. 1425, 1448–51 (1987) (“[F]ederalism 
enabled the American People to conquer government power by dividing it. Each government 
agency, state and national, would have incentives to win the principal’s affections by monitoring 
and challenging the other’s misdeeds.”). 
RUBENSTEIN 10.20.2013 (DO NOT DELETE) 10/21/2013  10:40 PM 
2013] IMMIGRATION STRUCTURALISM 93 
Though the Constitution divides power both horizontally and 
vertically, the demarcation of precise boundaries admits of no easy 
solutions.61 In the separation of powers context, for example, the 
Court has recognized that a certain degree of policymaking inheres in 
executive action.62 And, in the federalism context, the Court has 
generally forgone trying to delineate spheres of federal and state 
exclusivity.63 The flexibility inherent in this imprecision holds 
significance along both structural dimensions. Horizontally, it 
manifests as power sharing and grabbing that generate far more 
federal law than would otherwise exist. Vertically, the absence of 
bright constitutional lines tends to invite federal growth in regulatory 
fields that might otherwise be repelled by an enclave of state 
exclusivity. 
The cumulative effect of a qualitatively expansive federal power 
and a quantitatively expansive federal law results in a significant 
increase in federal-state regulatory overlap. This phenomenon of 
modern government foists enormous pressure on the Supremacy 
Clause,64 which is the Constitution’s sorting device for the inevitable 
conflicts between federal and subfederal law.65 
 
 
 
 61. THE FEDERALIST NO. 37 (James Madison) (“Experience has instructed us that no skill 
in the science of government has yet been able to discriminate and define, with sufficient 
certainty, its three great provinces—the legislative, executive, and judiciary . . . . Questions daily 
occur in the course of practice which prove the obscurity which reigns in these subjects.”). 
 62. See, e.g., Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’n, 531 U.S. 457, 475 (2001) (acknowledging 
that a certain degree of lawmaking is inherent in executive action due to its discretionary 
nature). 
 63. See, e.g., Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 547–56 (1985) 
(explaining that the limits on Congress’s authority to directly regulate the states was mostly 
relegated to the political process); see also Erwin Chemerinsky, The Values of Federalism, 47 
FLA. L. REV. 499, 507 (1995) (noting the “Court’s refusal to use state sovereignty to limit 
congressional powers”); Peter L. Strauss, Formal and Functional Approaches to Separation-of-
Powers Questions—A Foolish Inconsistency?, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 488, 514 (1987) (observing 
that the Court in Garcia “abandoned to the federal political process any effort to define the 
proper interpenetration of federal and state authority”). 
 64. David S. Rubenstein, Delegating Supremacy?, 65 VAND. L. REV. 1125, 1135 (2012) (“It 
is one thing for the Court to embrace a system of ‘concurrent federalism,’ which potentially pits 
federal law against state regulatory programs occupying the same field. It is quite another 
matter, however, when federal law displaces—rather than merely overlaps—state regulation.”). 
 65. See, e.g., Viet D. Dinh, Reassessing the Law of Preemption, 88 GEO. L.J. 2085, 2088 
(2000) (explaining that the “Supremacy Clause only prescribed a constitutional choice of law 
rule, one that gives federal law precedence over [directly] conflicting state law” (alteration in 
original)). 
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Bradford Clark provides an important account of how the 
Supremacy Clause mutually reinforces the principles of separation of 
powers and federalism.66 As bears repeating, the Supremacy Clause 
provides that the “Constitution,” “Laws . . . made in pursuance 
thereof,” and “Treaties . . . shall be the supreme law of the land.”67 As 
Professor Clark highlights, the text of the Supremacy Clause 
discriminates as to the types of federal law that can preempt.68 Of 
equal importance, both the drafting history and the constitutional 
structure suggest that the procedures for adopting these types of laws 
were to be the exclusive means for rendering them supreme.69 
More specifically, as used in the Supremacy Clause, “[t]his 
Constitution” refers to the original Constitution adopted in 
accordance with Article VII and to subsequent amendments adopted 
in accordance with Article V.70 Meanwhile, the Clause’s reference to 
“the Laws of the United States . . . made in Pursuance [thereof]” 
 
 66. See generally Clark, Separation of Powers, supra note 12; Clark, The Procedural 
Safeguards, supra note 23. 
 67. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. 
 68. Id.; Clark, Separation of Powers, supra note 12, at 1326. 
 69. See, e.g., Clark, Separation of Powers, supra note 12, at 1330–31 (analyzing the 
procedures for adopting these laws). To be sure, Professor Clark’s interpretation of the 
Supremacy Clause is not universally shared. For important critiques, see Thomas Merrill, 
Preemption and Institutional Choice, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 727 (2008); Henry Paul Monaghan, 
Supremacy Clause Textualism, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 731 (2010); Peter L. Strauss, The Perils of 
Theory, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1567 (2008). In my estimation, however, the text, context, and 
drafting history of the Supremacy Clause strongly support Professor Clark’s understanding for 
reasons that he and others have expressed. See, e.g., Bradford R. Clark, Constitutional 
Compromise and the Supremacy Clause, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1421, 1424–25 (2008); 
Bradford R. Clark, Domesticating Sole Executive Agreements, 93 VA. L. REV. 1573 (2007) 
[hereinafter Clark, Domesticating Sole Executive Agreements]; Bradford R. Clark, Federal 
Lawmaking and the Role of Structure in Constitutional Interpretation, 96 CAL. L. REV. 699, 703 
(2008) [hereinafter Clark, Federal Lawmaking and the Role of Structure]; Clark, Separation of 
Powers, supra note 12; see also Brandon P. Denning & Michael D. Ramsey, supra note 12; 
Young, Executive Preemption, supra note 12. In any event, to the extent that the Supremacy 
Clause may be interpreted to include unconventional forms of lawmaking, we might still 
prefer—on normative grounds—to limit what can qualify. Thus, for example, while we might 
make preemptive accommodations for federal common law, see, e.g., Clearfield Trust Co. v. 
United States, 318 U.S. 363 (1943), administrative regulations, see, e.g., Geier v. Am. Honda 
Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861 (2000), and non-treaty executive agreements, see, e.g., Am. Ins. Ass’n v. 
Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 416–17 (2003), we need not recognize all forms of federal action as 
having preemptive effect. Without canvassing all of the possibilities, this Article’s limited claim 
is that nonbinding executive enforcement policies constitutionally cannot—or, short of that, 
normatively should not—have preemptive effect. This is not to concede that other forms of 
unconventional lawmaking can or should have preemptive effect; it is just to place those issues 
beyond the scope of this Article. For additional discussion of these points, see also infra notes 
242–47 and 261−63 and accompanying text. 
 70. Clark, Separation of Powers, supra note 12, at 1332–33. 
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seemingly refers to “Laws” produced by the procedures set forth in 
Article I, Section 7.71 Under these procedures, a bill may “become a 
Law” only after traversing the bicameralism and presentment 
requirements.72 Finally, the Supremacy Clause’s reference to 
“Treaties” contemplates those made pursuant to the procedures set 
forth in Article II.73 Specifically, the Treaty Clause provides that the 
President “shall have Power, by and with the Advice and Consent of 
the Senate, to make Treaties, provided two-thirds of the Senators 
present concur.”74 
As Professor Clark highlights, each of the procedures for creating 
supreme law requires the assent of the Senate.75 And this was no 
historical accident; the Senate was designed to represent the states at 
the national level.76 Indeed, Professor Clark recounts, “the states 
agreed to the supremacy of federal law only on the condition that 
they or their representatives in the Senate would have the 
opportunity to veto any and all proposals capable of displacing state 
law.”77 
These insights factor heavily in the discussion that follows. An 
appreciation for the interdimensional relationship between separation 
of powers and federalism offers possibilities for safeguarding both. As 
further explored in Part III, insisting upon the Constitution’s 
prescribed methods for adopting supreme federal law reinforces the 
states’ political and procedural protection in the legislative process.78 
 
 71. Id. at 1334. That the phrase “Laws . . . made in Pursuance [of the Constitution]” was 
most likely intended to refer to statutes is strongly supported by the drafting history. Before 
being revised by the Committee of Detail, the phrase in question read: “The Acts of the 
Legislature of the United States made in pursuance of this Constitution . . . shall be the Supreme 
law of the several States.” JAMES MADISON, NOTES ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION, 
reprinted in THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 183 (Max Farrand ed., rev. 
ed. 1937) (emphasis added). 
 72. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7. 
 73. See Clark, Separation of Powers, supra note 12, at 1337–38. 
 74. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (emphasis added). 
 75. Clark, Separation of Powers, supra note 12, at 1339. 
 76. Id.; see also Clark, Federal Lawmaking and the Role of Structure, supra note 69, at 703. 
 77. Clark, Domesticating Sole Executive Agreements, supra note 69, at 1601–02 (2007). 
 78. Ernest A. Young, Constitutional Avoidance, Resistance Norms, and the Preservation of 
Judicial Review, 78 TEX. L. REV. 1549, 1609 (2000) (“[T]he ultimate political safeguard may be 
the procedural gauntlet that any legislative proposal must run and the concomitant difficulty of 
overcoming legislative inertia.”); Young, Two Cheers, supra note 13, at 1358 (“[A]lmost every 
separation of powers issue acquires federalism connotations as well: the more we shift 
government authority away from Congress to the federal Executive . . . the less meaningful the 
states’ representation in Congress becomes.”); see also Clark, Separation of Powers, supra note 
12, at 1438–39. 
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In this way, separation of powers safeguards federalism.79 At the same 
time, federalism can safeguard separation of powers.80 Limiting the 
class of preemptive federal laws to those expressly contemplated in 
the Supremacy Clause puts pressure on the federal political branches 
to adhere to constitutionally prescribed lawmaking procedures—at 
least when the political branches intend for their policies to have 
preemptive effect. Moreover, when such lawmaking procedures are 
not followed, foreclosing the preemptive effect of such policies leaves 
room for dissenting subfederal action that can spur a congressional or 
judicial check upon executive action. 
II. HORIZONTAL DOUBT AND THE VERTICAL RESPONSE 
The foregoing discussion recounted how our Constitution 
prophylactically secures liberty by separating power both horizontally 
and vertically. It further provided an account of the interdimensional 
relationship between separation of powers and federalism. This Part 
now turns to a discussion of how horizontal separation of powers 
norms have been threatened or undermined in the immigration 
context. Section A directs particular attention to: (1) the Court’s 
abdication of any meaningful constitutional review of the federal 
political branches’ substantive immigration policies; (2) Congress’s 
vast conferral of policymaking power to the Executive; and (3) the 
Executive’s potential usurpation of Congress’s lawmaking function 
under the auspices of prosecutorial discretion and foreign affairs. 
Section B then explains how the latter two threats impact 
immigration federalism, as most recently expressed through the 
subfederal revolution. The failure of meaningful judicial review is less 
relevant to the subfederal response, but will be revisited in Part IV as 
a reason to worry about a federal monopoly over immigration 
enforcement. 
 
 79. See generally Clark, Separation of Powers, supra note 12 (elaborating on the political 
and procedural safeguards of federalism). 
 80. Jessica Bulman-Pozen has recently described how “cooperative federalism” schemes 
that delegate responsibility to states provide more opportunity for states to check executive 
action and inaction. Bulman-Pozen, supra note 12, at 462 (“By assigning states a role in 
executing federal law, Congress has—often unwittingly—empowered them to provide the sort 
of check on executive power that it is often unable, or unwilling, to provide directly.”); see also 
Heather K. Gerken & Jessica Bulman-Pozen, Uncooperative Federalism, 118 YALE L.J. 1256 
(2009) (discussing how states use power conferred by the federal government as a mean of 
resisting federal policy). As developed in Part III, infra, my theory of immigration structuralism 
builds on that idea to explain how normalizing immigration preemption doctrine offers states 
similar space to promote separation of powers norms. 
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A. Immigration Separation of Powers 
Federal immigration law is a renowned “oddity” where the 
“normal rules of constitutional law simply do not apply.”81 This 
constitutional exceptionalism may be ascribed to the amorphous 
origins of the federal immigration power. That power has been said to 
arise from any number of constitutional sources—some express, some 
implied—but often not tied to any one in particular.82 Federal 
immigration power has at times even been linked to 
extraconstitutional sovereignty norms.83 Though it is now widely 
accepted that a federal immigration power exists, the power’s 
uncertain wellspring generates ripple effects for separation of powers 
(and also for federalism, though that is not this section’s immediate 
concern). 
This section considers two aspects of immigration separation of 
powers: first, as between the political branches and the Court; second, 
as between the political branches themselves. The former has been the 
subject of extensive academic attention, and is thus well-rehearsed.84 
Less critical attention has focused on the latter, though momentum is 
 
 81. Stephen H. Legomsky, Immigration Law and the Principle of Plenary Congressional 
Power, 1984 SUP. CT. REV. 255, 260 [hereinafter Legomsky, Immigration Law]; accord Peter H. 
Schuck, The Transformation of Immigration Law, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 1 (1984). 
 82. See, e.g., Toll v. Moreno, 458 U.S. 1, 10 (1982) (holding that federal authority over 
immigration derives from the constitutionally enumerated power to “establish [a] uniform Rule 
of Naturalization,” the Foreign Commerce Clause, and the more implicit authority over foreign 
affairs (alteration in original)); Adam B. Cox, Essay, Deference, Delegation, and Immigration 
Law, 74 U. CHI. L. REV. 1671, 1673 (2007) (remarking on the Court’s “ambiguous 
pronouncements about the source of federal immigration authority”); see also U.S. CONST. art. 
I, § 8, cl. 4. 
 83. See Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581, 603–04, 609 (1889) (holding that the 
doctrine of inherent sovereignty affords the federal government plenary authority over 
immigration); accord Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2498 (noting that the federal 
immigration power rests, in part, on the government’s “power as sovereign to control and 
conduct relations with foreign nations”). 
 84. For a sampling of this voluminous body of work, see generally Jennifer M. Chacón, 
Unsecured Borders: Immigration Restrictions, Crime Control and National Security, 39 CONN. L. 
REV. 1827, 1868 (2007); Gabriel J. Chin, Segregation’s Last Stronghold: Race Discrimination and 
the Constitutional Law of Immigration, 46 UCLA L. REV. 1, 6–7 (1998) [hereinafter Chin, 
Segregation’s Last Stronghold]; Developments in the Law: Immigrant Rights & Immigration 
Enforcement, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1565, 1584−92 (2013); Louis Henkin, The Constitution and 
United States Sovereignty: A Century of Chinese Exclusion and Its Progeny, 100 HARV. L. REV. 
853 (1987); Kevin R. Johnson, Minorities, Immigrant and Otherwise, 118 YALE L.J. POCKET 
PART 77 (2008); Legomsky, Immigration Law, supra note 81, at 255; Hiroshi Motomura, 
Immigration Law After a Century of Plenary Power: Phantom Constitutional Norms and 
Statutory Interpretation, 100 YALE L.J. 545 (1990) [hereinafter Motomura, Immigration Law 
After a Century of Plenary Power]; Juliet P. Stumpf, States of Confusion: The Rise of State and 
Local Power over Immigration, 86 N.C. L. REV. 1557, 1572 (2008). 
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quickly building.85 
1. Political vs. Judicial 
The Court long ago eschewed any meaningful constitutional 
review of the political branches’ substantive immigration policies.86 
Under the so-called “plenary doctrine,” the Court has declared itself 
virtually powerless to review even those policies that facially classify 
by nationality, race, gender, or legitimacy.87 Early expressions of the 
plenary doctrine suggested that the federal power to admit or expel 
immigrants admitted of no substantive constitutional limit.88 That is, 
the federal immigration power was understood to be 
extraconstitutional, thereby unconstrained by the guarantees of 
liberty otherwise enshrined in the Bill of Rights.89 More recently, 
however, the Court has retreated from this extraconstitutional 
reasoning. Instead, the plenary doctrine is now generally conceived as 
a species of the political question doctrine, triggered by concern over 
judicial meddling in foreign policy.90 This separation of powers 
 
 85. For recent treatments of immigration separation of powers questions, see generally 
Adam B. Cox & Cristina M. Rodriguez, The President and Immigration Law, 119 YALE L.J. 458 
(2009); Gilbert, Obama’s Ruby Slippers, supra note 19; Margulies, supra note 19; Cristina M. 
Rodriguez, Constraint Through Delegation: The Case of Executive Control over Immigration 
Policy, 59 DUKE L.J. 1787 (2010) [hereinafter Rodriguez, Constraint Through Delegation]; Yoo 
& Delahunty, supra note 19. For an earlier treatment, see generally Legomsky, The Making of 
United States Refugee Policy, supra note 4. 
 86. See, e.g., Motomura, Immigration Law After a Century of Plenary Power, supra note 84, 
at 550–60 (describing the roots of the plenary power doctrine). 
 87. See generally Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698 (1893) (race); Chae Chan 
Ping, 130 U.S. 581 (race); Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787 (1977) (gender and legitimacy); see also 
Legomsky, The Making of United States Refugee Policy, supra note 4, at 255 (“In an undeviating 
line of cases spanning almost one hundred years, the Court has declared itself powerless to 
review even those immigration provisions that explicitly classify on such disfavored bases as 
race, gender, and legitimacy.”). 
 88. See generally Fong Yue Ting, 149 U.S. at 707; Nishimura Ekiu v. United States, 142 U.S. 
651, 659 (1892); Chae Chan Ping, 130 U.S. at 603 (1889); see also Legomsky, The Making of 
United States Refugee Policy, supra note 4, at 274 (“One theory advanced in some of the plenary 
power cases, with varying degrees of explicitness, is that the power either to exclude or to 
deport aliens is inherent in sovereignty, and that Congress’s exercise of that power is therefore 
immune from substantive constitutional constraints.”); Hiroshi Motomura, Federalism, 
International Human Rights, and Immigration Exceptionalism, 70 U. COLO. L. REV. 1361, 1372 
(1999) (explaining that “[t]he early plenary power cases established a pattern of discourse that 
conceptualized immigration control as a matter of national sovereignty”). 
 89. See Legomsky, Immigration Law, supra note 81, at 257–58 (detailing the dimensions of 
Congress’s plenary power over immigration). 
 90. See, e.g., Negusie v. Holder, 559 U.S. 511, 517 (2009) (“Judicial deference in the 
immigration context is of special importance, for executive officials ‘exercise especially sensitive 
political functions that implicate questions of foreign relations.’” (quoting INS v. Abudu, 485 
U.S. 94, 110 (1988))); Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 81−82 (1976) (“The reasons that preclude 
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conception yields a marginally less dangerous—but still sweeping—
federal immigration power. It is marginally less dangerous because 
the Court seems willing to take a peek at the substance of federal 
immigration law.91 But the residuum of super-deference still produces 
irksome judicial countenancing of “official conduct that would never 
be tolerated against an ordinary backdrop.”92 
For generations now, the plenary doctrine has been widely 
assaulted as an anachronism with little descriptive or normative 
appeal.93 To be sure, a conceptual and sometimes real relationship 
exists between immigration and foreign affairs. The connection 
derives from the effect that immigration decisions have on foreign 
nationals. Adverse immigration decisions carry the potential for 
international tension.94 Even favorable immigration decisions carry 
the potential to undercut foreign policy⎯for example, by undermining 
bargaining positions in negotiations with countries whose nationals 
are affected.95 Yet as several immigration scholars have explained, the 
harbinger of foreign repercussion is no reason for abandoning 
meaningful judicial review in the great bulk of cases where foreign 
policy is not actually implicated or seriously threatened.96 
 
 
 
judicial review of political questions also dictate a narrow standard of review of decisions made 
by Congress or the President in the area of immigration and naturalization.”). 
 91. See Fiallo, 430 U.S. at 792 (1977) (noting that the political judgments over immigration 
are “largely immune”—and, implicitly not completely immune—from judicial control (quoting 
Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 210 (1953))). 
 92. Peter J. Spiro, Learning to Live with Immigration Federalism, 29 CONN. L. REV. 1627, 
1629 (1997) [hereinafter Spiro, Learning to Live]; see also Mathews, 426 U.S. at 79–80 (“In the 
exercise of its broad power over naturalization and immigration, Congress regularly makes rules 
that would be unacceptable if applied to citizens.”). 
 93. See T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Citizens, Aliens, Membership and the Constitution, 7 
CONST. COMMENT. 9, 34 (1990) (“The immigration power should be brought within the fold of 
other congressional powers and subjected to the constitutional limits normally applied to those 
powers.”); Peter H. Schuck, Taking Immigration Federalism Seriously, 2007 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 
57, 57 (“Despite the plenary power doctrine’s authority, it has been assailed over the years by 
many academics and defended, I think, by none.”). 
 94. Legomsky, Immigration Law, supra note 81, at 262. 
 95. Id.; see also Huyen Pham, The Inherent Flaws in the Inherent Authority Position: Why 
Inviting Local Enforcement of Immigration Laws Violates the Constitution, 31 FLA. ST. U. L. 
REV. 965, 991–92 (2004) (describing how immigration policies can impact the United States’ 
relation with the immigrants’ home countries). 
 96. See Henkin, supra note 84, at 862 (describing Chinese Exclusion as an exception and “a 
relic of a different era”); Legomsky, Immigration Law, supra note 81, at 268 (realizing that 
“[o]nly in a few special instances do immigration cases realistically affect foreign policy”). 
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As Louis Henkin summarized, the plenary doctrine traces to an 
earlier era 
in which constitutional restraints were deemed inapplicable to 
actions by the United States outside its territory; when orotund 
generalities about sovereignty and national security were a 
substitute for significant scrutiny of governmental action 
impinging on individual rights; [and] when the Bill of Rights had 
not yet become our national hallmark and the principle 
justification and preoccupation of judicial review.97 
Still, the plenary doctrine remains curiously persistent. 
2. Congress vs. the Executive 
In the immigration context, the Court has “long glossed over 
separation-of-powers questions” pertaining to the division of power 
among the political branches.98 Although Congress is our traditional 
lawmaking branch, the Executive wields an enormous influence over 
immigration policy. This power sharing is attributable to (1) sporadic 
claims of inherent executive authority, (2) more so, to express 
congressional delegations of discretionary power, but (3) mostly to 
what Adam Cox and Cristina Rodriguez refer to as “de facto 
delegation.”99 As they explain, Congress has de facto delegated 
immigration authority to the Executive in two ways. Most 
significantly, the Executive enjoys primary control over a very sizable 
unauthorized population due to the combination of Congress’s 
“stringent admissions conditions” and the Executive’s inability to 
effectively police the border.100 Moreover, Congress has radically 
expanded the grounds by which lawfully admitted immigrants may be 
deported.101 The result is that approximately one-third of all 
noncitizens in the United States are removable at the Executive’s 
option.102 It is not clear whether Congress intends this result, though 
certainly it is within the realm of political possibility. De facto 
delegation—intended or not—allows Congress to exude publicly a 
tough position on immigration while simultaneously, and more subtly, 
passing the buck to the Executive.103 
 
 97. Henkin, supra note 84, at 862. 
 98. Cox & Rodriguez, supra note 85, at 460. 
 99. Id. at 462, 511–14. 
 100. Id. at 463. 
 101. Id. 
 102. Id. 
 103. Id. at 529 (“Congress might accrue political benefits from making immigration law on 
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Emphatically, my objective here is not to insist that congressional 
delegation violates separation of powers. Nor do I mean to suggest 
that a court would or should probe deep enough to uncover a 
violation. Rather, my more modest suggestion is that congressional 
delegations to the Executive threaten separation of powers norms, 
insofar as these delegations represent a seismic transfer of 
immigration policymaking from Congress to the Executive. In turn, 
this shift threatens the very liberties that separation of powers was 
intended to secure. 
As Professors Cox and Rodriguez explain, de facto delegation 
makes it substantively possible for the Executive to alter the 
immigration labor force, to permit removable immigrants with 
criminal convictions to remain in the country, and more.104 Of equal 
concern here, de facto delegation procedurally enables the Executive 
to do so without resort to the legislative process—and, indeed, at 
times in contravention to Congress’s expressed will.105 Moreover, 
Professors Cox and Rodriguez explain, the Executive’s immigration 
power is “asymmetrical” insofar as it “operates principally at the back 
end of the system, through the exercise of prosecutorial discretion 
with respect to whom to deport, rather than at the front end of the 
system, through decisions about whom to admit.”106 This asymmetry 
“can lead to perverse consequences, particularly with respect to the 
management of unauthorized immigration,”107 where opportunities for 
selective enforcement abound.108 
Of related concern, the accumulation of immigration power in the 
Executive renders the power more fickle and potentially more 
arbitrary. Executive immigration policy is subject to significant change 
with each new presidential inauguration.109 Indeed, the political 
moment of a new presidency is not even necessary, as executive policy 
can change on a whim even within a President’s tenure. To be sure, 
 
the books even harsher and bear few of the political costs associated with immigration 
enforcement efforts.”); cf. Elizabeth Garrett, The Purposes of Framework Legislation, 14 J. 
CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 717, 733 (2005) (describing Congress’s use of symbolic legislation); 
William Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100 MICH. L. REV. 505, 514 (2001) 
(noting the same potential in the criminal law context). 
 104. Cox & Rodriguez, supra note 85, at 464. 
 105. Id. 
 106. Id. 
 107. Id. at 464–65. 
 108. See Rodriguez, Constraint Through Delegation, supra note 85, at 1796 (criticizing the 
current immigration system’s “excessive prosecutorial discretion”). 
 109. Cox & Rodriguez, supra note 85, at 464. 
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movements in policy are to be expected and sometimes encouraged. 
But here I draw a critical distinction between policy shifts generated 
through the constitutionally prescribed lawmaking process, on the one 
hand, and policy shifts occasioned though unilateral executive 
(in)action, on the other. Because nonbinding executive policymaking 
is generally less deliberative and transparent than the legislative 
process,110 it is also potentially more arbitrary and dangerous. 
Of course, the foregoing separation of powers concerns may 
simply be beside the point if there is no constitutionally ordained 
division of immigration power among the political branches. That is, 
perhaps there are no constitutional limits on what Congress can 
delegate or on what the Executive may claim for itself. Such is not 
unthinkable given the wisps of extraconstitutionality in the Court’s 
foundational immigration cases.111 The notion of immigration 
separation of powers immunity, however, is wildly incompatible with 
the Court’s seminal decision in INS v. Chadha.112 There, the Court held 
that an immigration statute containing a legislative veto violated 
separation of powers because it circumvented the Constitution’s 
“finely wrought” bicameralism and presentment requirements.113 Thus, 
at minimum, the Court’s earlier musings of an extraconstitutional 
immigration power seem to have no purchase on the federal 
 
 110. See, e.g., Loving v. United States, 517 U.S. 748, 757–58 (1996) (“Article I’s precise rules 
of representation, member qualifications, bicameralism, and voting procedure make Congress 
the branch most capable of responsive and deliberative lawmaking.”); Rodriguez, Constraint 
Through Delegation, supra note 85, at 1801, 1804 (discussing the lack of executive transparency 
in prosecutorial discretion as compared to legislative action). The Obama Administration’s 
DACA program may be an exception. Both the unveiling and administration of the program 
have been remarkably transparent. See Eric Posner, The Imperial President of Arizona, SLATE 
(June 26, 2012, 12:04 PM) (noting the transparency around DACA’s unveiling). What is notably 
less transparent, however, is the motivation for the program—in particular, whether and to what 
extent it owes to political preference or resource constraints. The President himself sent very 
mixed messages when he announced the DACA program. See The White House, Office of the 
Press Secretary, Remarks by the President on Immigration (June 15, 2012), available at 
http://whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2012/06/15/remarks-president-immigration (referring to 
the program, at times, as the “right thing to do” for a class of undocumented immigrants who in 
fairness do not deserve to be deported, and later noting the administration’s desire to “focus . . . 
immigration enforcement resources in the right places”). Apart from President Obama’s own 
statements, the program’s timing around the 2012 presidential election suggests that politics was 
a motivating factor. Plus, given the resources necessary to implement the program, it is not clear 
that government time, money, and energy are being conserved. 
 111. See supra note 88 and accompanying text. 
 112. 462 U.S. 919 (1983). See Cox & Rodriguez, supra note 85, at 477–78 (discussing 
Chadha’s implications for separation of powers norms in the immigration context). 
 113. Chadha, 462 U.S. at 951 (“[T]he prescription for legislative action in Art. I, §§ 1, 7 
represents the Framers’ decision that the legislative power of the Federal government be 
exercised in accord with a single, finely wrought and exhaustively considered, procedure.”). 
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lawmaking process. 
Still, to say that separation of powers principles generally apply to 
immigration lawmaking does not necessarily foreclose the need for 
special treatment when foreign affairs are implicated.114 Nor does it 
resolve whether conventional separation of powers norms have been 
upset in the ways I have suggested above. Before turning to the 
complicating variable of foreign affairs, I begin here with 
conventional domestic norms: specifically, in regards to 
congressionally delegated power and the executive authority of 
prosecutorial discretion. 
a. The Delegation Defense 
Despite Article I’s vesting of “all” legislative power in Congress, 
the Court has long held that Congress may delegate policymaking to 
the Executive Branch so long as the statute provides an “intelligible 
principle” to sufficiently guide the exercise of discretion.115 It thus may 
be argued that delegations clearing this threshold raise no separation 
of powers concerns. However, as every student of administrative law 
quickly comes to learn, the so-called “nondelegation” doctrine is a 
misnomer.116 Virtually nothing fails the intelligible principle test, 
leaving the breadth of Congress’s delegations virtually unchecked.117 
Accordingly, reliance on the nondelegation doctrine as a sweeping 
defense of the structural concerns raised above rings hollow: The 
 
 114. See, e.g., Pham, supra note 95, at 264 (“[E]ven assuming that the president may not 
contradict or defy a particular congressional direction, the Court understands that 
administration of the immigration laws implicates foreign policy and national security in ways in 
which other executive decisions might not.”). 
 115. See J.W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 409 (1928) (formulating 
the intelligible principle test); see also Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’n, 531 U.S. 457, 472 (2001) 
(applying the intelligible principle test); Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 374–75, 379 
(1989) (same). 
 116. That the nondelegation doctrine is notoriously underenforced is a point made by many. 
See, e.g., Lisa Schultz Bressman, Beyond Accountability: Arbitrariness and Legitimacy in the 
Administrative State, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 461, 517 (2003) (describing how the Court’s lax 
intelligible principle standard has rendered this limit on administrative discretion essentially 
meaningless); Cass R. Sunstein, Nondelegation Canons, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 315, 338 (2002) 
(noting that “the ban on unacceptable delegations is a judicially underenforced norm”). 
 117. See, e.g., Whitman, 531 U.S. at 474–75 (“[W]e have ‘almost never felt qualified to 
second-guess Congress regarding the permissible degree of policy judgment that can be left to 
those executing or applying the law.’” (quoting Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 416 (Scalia, J., 
dissenting))); Gary Lawson, The Rise and Rise of the Administrative State, 107 HARV. L. REV. 
1231, 1241 (1994); Merrill, supra note 69, at 2099 (remarking on the “judicial attitude of great 
deference in determining whether any particular statute confers too much discretion” and 
observing that the “nondelegation doctrine, while still formally considered part of our structural 
Constitution, is effectively unenforceable”). 
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underenforced nondelegation norm is itself a slippage of separation of 
powers. 
In any event, even where express congressional delegations justify 
executive policymaking, de facto delegations raise very different 
concerns. In such cases, the Executive operates outside of Congress’s 
written law. Any suggestion that Congress legislatively graces such 
action—in wink-and-nod fashion—might be descriptively accurate. To 
endorse the practice, however, would be constitutionally nihilistic. 
After all, “[w]hat would the enactment of statutory law mean, if 
Congress also consciously enabled and encouraged the Executive not 
to enforce it?”118 
b. The Inherency Defense 
Apart from justifications tied to congressional delegation, it may 
be argued that separation of powers norms are not threatened, insofar 
as the Executive enjoys inherent immigration authority under the 
Article II auspices of prosecutorial discretion and foreign affairs.119 
But, as explained below, these powers do not save all executive 
immigration action from doubt. 
i. Prosecutorial Discretion 
Prosecutorial discretion in the immigration context cuts broadly.120 
It is conventionally understood to encompass “decisions about which 
offenses or populations to target; whom to stop, interrogate, and 
arrest; whether to detain or to release a noncitizen; whether to initiate 
removal proceedings; whether to execute a removal order; and 
various other decisions.”121 Notwithstanding the well-settled 
 
 118. Yoo & Delahunty, supra note 19, (manuscript at 55); cf. Frank Easterbrook, Statutes’ 
Domains, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 533, 540–41 (1983) (discussing the public interest in upholding 
legislative compromises). 
 119. Cf. Cox & Rodriguez, supra note 85, at 474–76, 492–501 (discussing the inherency 
rationale for executive immigration policy); see also Gerald L. Neuman, Discretionary 
Deportation, 20 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 611, 611 (2005–2006) (noting that “[t]he executive enjoys its 
customary authority not to pursue [immigration] enforcement”). 
 120. See Shoba Sivaprasad Wadhia, The Role of Prosecutorial Discretion in Immigration 
Law, 9 CONN. PUB. INT. L.J. 243, 244 (2010) (demonstrating how prosecutorial discretion with 
respect to immigration law can be exercised in a broad variety of ways); see also Hiroshi 
Motomura, The Discretion that Matters: Federal Immigration Enforcement, State and Local 
Arrests, and the Civil-Criminal Line, 58 UCLA L. REV. 1819, 1842 (2010−2011) [hereinafter 
Motomura, The Discretion that Matters] (highlighting that prosecutorial discretion is oftentimes 
misused as a “loose synonym” for enforcement discretion more generally). 
 121. Wadhia, supra note 120, at 244; see also Motomura, Immigration Outside the Law, 
supra note 5, at 2047 (discussing the discretionary nature of immigration enforcement); 
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foundation of the Executive’s immigration enforcement discretion, 
important conceptual limits remain. 
At one spectral pole, it is uncontroverted that the Executive can 
make prosecutorial decisions in individual cases in any of the above-
referenced categories, as resources or case-specific equities demand.122 
At the other spectral pole, however, the conventional (though 
perhaps not universal) understanding is that the Executive cannot 
exercise prosecutorial discretion to make Law in contravention of 
congressional will.123 That much, at least, seems clear from the 
constitutional command that the President “take Care that the Laws 
be faithfully executed,” as well as from the exacting prescription for 
lawmaking in Article I, Section 7.124 Between these outer poles lies a 
 
Neuman, Discretionary Deportation, supra note 119, at 611 (same). 
 122. See Saikrishna Prakash, Regulating Presidential Powers, 91 CORNELL L. REV. 215, 257 
(2005) (reviewing HAROLD J. KRENT, PRESIDENTIAL POWERS (2005)) (“[T]he president is to 
carry out his duties the best he can given the constraints of time, resources, and funding. When 
he does this, he fulfills his constitutional obligations.”); Wadhia, supra note 120, at 244–45 
(referring to resource constraints and humanitarian concerns as a “two-fold” justification for 
prosecutorial discretion); Yoo & Delahunty, supra note 19, (manuscript at 48) (“Obviously the 
President cannot secure full execution of the laws, if Congress denies to him adequate means of 
doing so.”); id. (manuscript at 45) (recognizing that “[b]reach of the Executive’s enforcement 
duty might also be excused based on equitable considerations in an individual case (or a small 
set of cases”); see also Love & Garg, supra note 19, (manuscript at 19) (noting that it would be 
illogical to hold the President responsible for inaction that is due to congressional 
underfunding); Cass R. Sunstein, Reviewing Agency Inaction After Heckler v. Chaney, 52 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 653, 670 (1985) (stating that the Executive has the appropriate discretion “to set 
enforcement priorities and allocate resources to those problems . . . that seem most severe”). 
 123. See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 637−38 (1952) (Jackson, J., 
concurring); see also Love & Garg, supra note 19, (manuscript at 4−6) (arguing that presidential 
inaction, via prosecutorial discretion or otherwise, can upset separation of powers when such 
inaction is in derogation of statutory command); Margulies, supra note 19, (manuscript at 4) 
(arguing that, under Justice Jackson’s schematic in Youngstown, DACA cannot be justified as a 
lawful exercise of prosecutorial discretion); Sunstein, Reviewing Agency Inaction, supra note 
122, at 670 (noting conceptual distinction between exercising discretion to account for resource 
constraints, on the one hand, and “refusing to carry out obligations that Congress has imposed 
on the Executive, on the other); cf. Daniel Kanstroom, Surrounding the Hole in the Doughnut: 
Discretion and Deference in U.S. Immigration Law, 71 TUL. L. REV. 703, 711 (1996–1997) (“The 
most basic problems of discretion are thus how to define and restrain its abuse without 
destroying its non-rule-like character, while maintaining its legitimacy within the legal 
community.”). 
 124. See Sunstein, Reviewing Agency Action, supra note 122, at 670 (“Although there will be 
difficult intermediate cases, the ‘take Care’ clause does not authorize the executive to fail to 
enforce those laws of which it disapproves.”); Yoo & Delahunty, supra note 19, (manuscript at 
passim) (offering contextual and historical support for understanding the “Take Care” Clause as 
an executive duty); see also Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 587–88 (“In the framework of our 
Constitution, the President’s power to see that the laws are faithfully executed refutes the idea 
that he is to be a lawmaker.”); Denning & Ramsey, supra note 12, at 827 (“A central tenet of 
separation-of-powers is that the executive is not a lawmaker.”). 
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sizable grey area that both hosts and obscures the conceptual line 
between permissible and impermissible exercises of prosecutorial 
discretion. Within that grey area—and not always evident on which 
side of the line—are systemic executive polices about how to treat 
different classes of immigrants or categories of offenses. 
It is well beyond my ambition here to develop a comprehensive 
model to calibrate exactly when prosecutorial discretion breaches the 
conceptual divide between law execution and lawmaking. (The 
promise of such a model would likely fail of its own ambition in any 
event). Still, there may be use here in sketching some intuitive 
guides.125 First, the more broadly or generally a systemic policy applies, 
the more it takes on the hue of law. The second variable is motivation. 
More specifically, if the systemic policy owes to a lack of resources, 
that should factor heavily in favor of permissible discretion. The 
Executive, after all, may only be expected to enforce the law using the 
resources legislatively made available. By contrast, if systemic 
prosecutorial inaction is driven by the Executive’s political or 
ideological preference, it tends to feel and act more like law. 
As I began with, this approach is far from complete and hardly 
satisfying. The variable of scope is necessarily relativistic; i.e., how 
broad is too broad? Similarly, most exercises of systemic prosecutorial 
discretion are partly motivated by both resource constraints and 
reasons of policy, yielding often impenetrable questions of relative 
degree. More fundamentally, however, even if the Executive could 
accurately and objectively articulate its motivations, it would be naïve 
to expect a transparent self-assessment in close cases when it matters 
most. Indeed, what makes prosecutorial discretion so potentially 
arbitrary is that there is no legal requirement for transparency.126 
Thus, we are left with an admittedly imperfect framework for 
discerning the boundaries of permissible enforcement discretion. But 
the lack of precision is part of the point. My ambition here is only to 
establish that: (1) there is a conceptual line between using 
prosecutorial discretion for law execution and lawmaking; (2) certain 
 
 125. For other recent attempts, see generally Love & Garg, supra note 19, (manuscript at 
14−15); Yoo & Delahunty, supra note 19. 
 126. See Strauss, supra note 69, at 112 (“[T]he executive is not obliged to express reasons for 
its choices either to enforce against one person rather than another, or to emphasize one law 
over another in its allocation of governmental resources.”); Sunstein, supra note 122, at 673 
(stating that the exercise of prosecutorial discretion “will often be unaccompanied by a record 
that a court might examine”). 
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exercises of prosecutorial discretion come closer to that line than 
others, and indeed, some may cross it; (3) we will not usually know 
when that line has been crossed; and (4) we should not expect courts 
to tell us when it has occurred.127 In short, without denying the 
Executive’s power of prosecutorial discretion, I wish to emphasize 
only that the power’s existence does not resolve residual uncertainties 
surrounding all of its uses—especially when those uses are systemic. 
This residual uncertainty, in turn, will become relevant again later in 
assessing how federalism norms might accommodate any such 
failings.128 
ii. Foreign Affairs 
The President’s constitutionally recognized role in foreign affairs 
offers yet another basis for inherent executive power over 
immigration.129 That there is a conceptual nexus between immigration 
and foreign affairs, however, says nothing about the Executive’s 
authority to make immigration law. 
The Constitution divides the foreign affairs power, and the bulk of 
it is vested in Congress.130 As pertains to immigration, Congress is 
vested with the power to establish a “uniform rule of Naturalization,” 
to regulate foreign commerce, to provide for the common defense, to 
prohibit the migration and importation of persons, and to make all 
laws necessary and proper for carrying out those powers.131 
Meanwhile, the Constitution is mostly silent as to the Executive 
foreign affairs power. The President has the power to make Treaties, 
but only with the advice and consent of the Senate.132 Any executive 
 
 127. See Love & Garg, supra note 19, (manuscript at 26−30) (observing that existing 
doctrine and prudential concerns hamstring courts’ ability to serve as a meaningful check 
against presidential inaction); Strauss, supra note 69, at 112; cf. Sunstein, Reviewing Agency 
Action, supra note 115, at 669–70 (observing that “[r]eluctance to review inaction has 
traditionally been based in part on a set of considerations counseling against judicial usurpation 
of the executive function,” but asserting that “if judicial involvement is based on a statutory 
violation by the executive, review promotes rather than undermines the separation of powers, 
for it helps to prevent the executive branch from ignoring congressional directives”). 
 128. See infra notes 272–87 and accompanying text. 
 129. See Gabriel J. Chin, The Unconstitutionality of State Regulation of Immigration 
Through Criminal Law, 61 DUKE L.J. 251, 264 n.50 (2011) (“Because the foreign-affairs power 
is at least partly in the hands of the president, some authority exists for the notion that the 
president has some inherent power in the immigration context.”). 
 130. Sarah H. Cleveland, Crosby and the One Voice Myth in U.S. Foreign Relations, 46 VILL. 
L. REV. 975, 984–85 (2001). 
 131. U.S. CONST. art. I, §§ 8, 18. 
 132. Id. art. II, § 2. 
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foreign affairs lawmaking authority must thus derive from elsewhere. 
Though not expressly enumerated, it is well-settled that the 
Article II executive power encompasses many significant foreign 
affairs functions, most notably developing foreign policy, 
communicating with foreign nations, and making non-treaty 
international agreements. But to the extent that these functions derive 
from the Article II “executive” power, “there is little basis for saying 
that it includes lawmaking power.”133 Moreover, nothing in the 
Constitution suggests that the Executive’s shaping of foreign policy 
may be to the exclusion of Congress. Much less is there a 
constitutional suggestion that, in matters involving immigration, the 
Executive can supplant Congress’s will.134 
*  *  * 
The foregoing discussion identified some potential failings in 
immigration separation of powers. Again, I do not insist upon any 
violations. Nor do I expect the courts to so find. Rather, my objectives 
in highlighting the potential failings are threefold. First, potential 
breakdown between the political branches offers descriptive context 
for the subfederal immigration revolution, discussed immediately 
below (Part II.B). Second, the potential failings along structuralism’s 
horizontal dimension offer normative thrust to a model that favors 
“compensating adjustments”135 along the vertical dimension (Part 
 
 133. Denning & Ramsey, supra note 12, at 912. 
 134. See Cox & Rodriguez, supra note 85, at 475 (explaining that executive action without 
congressional authorization is “in tension with conventional understandings of the separation of 
powers”); cf. Mary Fan, Rebellious State Crimmigration Enforcement and the Foreign Affairs 
Power, 89 WASH. U. L. REV. 1269, 1273 (2012) (noting that whatever the Executive’s role in 
foreign affairs, it is “subject to the vicissitudes of Congress”). 
 135. The idea of compensating adjustments is not new, and takes a number of forms. For 
discussions and applications, see, for example, Lawrence Lessig, Translating Federalism: United 
States v. Lopez, 1995 SUP. CT. REV. 125, 135 (describing how moderate changes in circumstance 
are used to justify increases in the scope of federal power); Peter McCutchen, Mistakes, 
Precedent, and the Rise of the Administrative State: Toward a Constitutional Theory of the 
Second Best, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 2 (1994) (describing compensating adjustments as a “form 
of constitutional damage control”); Cass R. Sunstein, Constitutionalism After The New Deal, 101 
HARV. L. REV. 421, 421 (1987) (advocating “the commitment to checks and balances through a 
system of coordinated review of agency action”); Adrian Vermeule, Hume’s Second-Best 
Constitutionalism, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 421, 422 (2003) (discussing the “second-best idea of 
compensating adjustments”); Ernest A. Young, Making Federalism Doctrine: Fidelity, 
Institutional Competence, and Compensating Adjustments, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1733, 1748–
62 (2005) [hereinafter Young, Making Federalism] (discussing compensating adjustments and 
the judicial role in structural cases); see also Michael J. Klarman, Antifidelity, 70 S. CAL. L. REV. 
381, 389 (1997) (discussing the “debilitating indeterminacy problems that compensating 
adjustments raise”); John F. Manning, Federalism and the Generality Problem in Constitutional 
Interpretation, 122 HARV. L. REV. 2003, 2065−67 (2009) (critiquing compensating approaches). 
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III).136 Third, the potential separation of powers failings caution 
against surrendering to the federal government an immigration 
monopoly, given the political branches’ spotty record on civil liberties 
in the immigration context and a Court unabashedly willing to defer 
(Part IV). 
B. The Subfederal Immigration Revolution 
Part I described the theoretical relationship between separation of 
powers and federalism. This section provides a complementing 
practical account; more specifically, it describes how perceived failings 
in immigration separation of powers have factored into an 
unprecedented subfederal response.137 
To be sure, a number of different theories have been proffered to 
explain the subfederal revolution: some tie it to changing 
demographic and economic conditions; others to racial bias; and still 
others to opportunistic politicking.138 But, whatever the causal mix, the 
subfederal immigration revolution is undoubtedly connected to—and 
principally targeted at—our sizable unlawful population.139 And, as 
described above, that population is largely the product of 
underenforced immigration laws. 
 
 
 
 136. Of course, we might also seek to directly attend to the separation of powers issues by 
drawing sharp(er) distinctions between congressional and executive functions. See generally 
Yoo & Delahunty, supra note 19. But, as explained above and further below, it is both too 
difficult and unlikely that the Court will do so. As explained in Part III, preemption doctrine 
offers a means for indirectly compensating for potential horizontal failings in a less judicially 
intrusive way. 
 137. See generally Keith Aoki & John Shuford, Welcome to Amerizona—Immigrants Out!: 
Assessing “Dystopian Dreams” and “Usable Futures” of Immigration Reform, and Considering 
Whether “Immigration Regionalism” is an Idea Whose Time has Come, 38 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 
1 (2010) (discussing the unprecedented nature of subfederal immigration activity); Keith 
Cunningham-Parmeter, Forced Federalism: States as Laboratories of Immigration Reform, 62 
HASTINGS L.J. 1673, 1674–75 (2011) (“Immigration law is undergoing an unprecedented 
upheaval.”). 
 138. See, e.g., Kristina M. Campbell, The Road to S.B. 1070: How Arizona Became Ground 
Zero for the Immigrants’ Rights Movement and the Continuing Struggle for Latino Civil Rights in 
America, 14 HARV. LATINO L. REV. 1, 2 (2011) (attributing the subfederal response to racism 
and xenophobia, particularly against Latinos); Johnson, Immigration and Civil Rights, supra 
note 2, at 617 (attributing subfederal movement to changing demographics and racial bias); 
Rodriguez, The Significance of the Local, supra note 41, at 594 (describing new migration 
patterns). 
 139. See Clare Huntington, The Constitutional Dimension of Immigration Federalism, 61 
VAND. L. REV. 787, 798 (2008). 
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The perception that the Executive is either unwilling or unable to 
enforce the law has led to subfederal concerns for the rule of law.140 
More pragmatically, there are many who fear that lapses in rule-of-
law norms will self-perpetuate to generate even more unlawful 
migration. As David Martin observes, “frustration with visible 
lawbreaking leads states and local governments to experiment with 
harsh measures meant to discourage illegal migration.”141 
Fiscal concerns are also generally cited by states and localities as a 
motivating force of restrictionist reforms. The costs of unauthorized 
immigration are spread unevenly both regionally and vertically 
among levels of government.142 Unauthorized immigration imposes 
costs on public security, transportation, and other local services.143 
Subfederal governments also must foot the bill for the primary and 
secondary education of undocumented children, emergency medical 
care, and the incarceration of undocumented immigrants who commit 
crimes in their jurisdictions.144 This is not to deny some economic 
advantage from unlawful immigration.145 However, as Peter Schuck 
explains, a “fiscal mismatch” occurs because most tax revenues 
generated by legal and illegal immigrants flow to the federal 
government while almost all of the costs are born at the subfederal 
 
 140. See, e.g., Appellants’ Opening Brief at 12, United States v. Arizona, 641 F.3d 339 (9th 
Cir. 2011) (No. 10-16645) (explaining that Arizona Senate Bill 1070 was enacted against federal 
“non-enforcement of the federal immigration laws” and the Department of Homeland 
Security’s alleged “inability (or unwillingness) to enforce the federal immigration laws 
effectively”); see also Kris Kobach, Attrition Through Enforcement: A Rational Approach to 
Illegal Immigration, 15 TULSA J. COMP. & INT’L L. 155, 156–57 (2007) (“Due to ICE’s 
inadequate manpower, illegal aliens know that the probability of actually encountering federal 
immigration enforcement officers is very low. In this environment, the rule of law has eroded 
persistently and pervasively.”). 
 141. David Martin, Eight Myths About Immigration Enforcement, 10 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & 
PUB. POL’Y 525, 551 (2007). 
 142. Huntington, supra note 139, at 805; Schuck, Taking Immigration Federalism Seriously, 
supra note 93, at 79. 
 143. Schuck, supra note 93, at 79–80. 
 144. Id. 
 145. For one analysis of the economic benefits of immigration, see Executive Office of the 
President, Counsel of Economic Advisers, Immigration’s Economic Impact, Jun. 20, 2007, 
available at http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/cea/cea_immigration_062007.html 
(finding that “immigrants not only fuel the Nation’s economic growth, but also have an overall 
positive effect on the income of native-born workers”). For an account of the economic effects 
of unlawful immigration, see Gordon H. Hanson, The Economics and Policy of Illegal 
Immigration in the United States (Migration Policy Inst. 2009), available at 
www.migrationpolicy.org/pubs/Hanson-Dec09.pdf (stating that “despite its faults, illegal 
immigration has been hugely beneficial to many US employers, often providing benefits that the 
current legal immigration system does not”). 
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level.146 Moreover, the fiscal burdens are not spread equally 
throughout the nation. Some regions and localities are impacted more 
than others depending on border proximity, national migration 
patterns, and regional enforcement priorities.147 
The perception (or fear) that the federal government may be 
intentionally leveraging the fiscal mismatch only adds fuel to the fire. 
Subfederal initiatives to recoup costs from the federal government 
have come up short both politically and judicially.148 Thus, when efforts 
at comprehensive immigration reform stalled in Congress about five 
years ago, subfederal governments rallied to pass regulations that 
increased enforcement and restricted benefits to unauthorized 
immigrants.149 
Behind these restrictionist measures is a philosophy of “attrition 
through enforcement.”150 The idea is that unlawful immigrants will 
“self-deport” as the “risks of detention or involuntary removal go up, 
and the probability of being able to obtain unauthorized employment 
goes down.”151 The subfederal restrictionist movement is also the 
platform for two politically-backed messages: the first is an 
 
 146. PETER SCHUCK, UNDERSTANDING AMERICA: THE ANATOMY OF AN EXCEPTIONAL 
NATION 350 (2009); see also Huntington, supra note 139, at 805 (examining the uneven 
distribution of costs among levels of government). 
 147. Cunningham-Parmeter, supra note 137, at 1708 (noting that the fiscal mismatch “harms 
some states more than others”). 
 148. See California v. United States, 104 F.3d 1086, 1094 (9th Cir. 1997) (holding that 
California has no enforceable right to federal reimbursement for the costs involved in 
incarcerating illegal aliens); Texas v. United States, 106 F.3d 661, 665 (5th Cir. 1997) (finding 
claims “seeking federal reimbursement [for immigration-related expenses] to be nonjusticiable 
and lacking in merit”); New Jersey v. United States, 91 F.3d 463, 469 (3d Cir. 1996) (denying 
New Jersey reimbursement for expenses incurred by the state for educating illegal immigrants); 
Padavan v. United States, 82 F.3d 23, 28 (2d Cir. 1996) (characterizing as “baseless” New York’s 
claims that the Federal Government forced the State to incur costs for incarcerating illegal 
aliens); Chiles v. United States, 69 F.3d 1094, 1097 (11th Cir. 1995) (concluding that Florida’s 
claims alleging unconstitutional federal coercion with respect to costs associated with illegal 
aliens to be “nonjusticiable political questions”). 
 149. For statistical accounts, see State Laws Related to Immigration and Immigrants, 
NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, http://www.ncsl.org/issues-research/immig/ 
state-laws-related-to-immigration-and-immigrants.aspx (last updated Feb. 22, 2012) (reporting 
the introduction of more than 7000 state immigration-related bills and the passage of more than 
1000 state laws and resolutions); see also Gabriel J. Chin et al., A Legal Labyrinth: Issues Raised 
by Arizona Senate Bill 1070, 25 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 47 (2010) (offering more descriptive 
accounts); Scott A. Gray, Note, Federalism’s Tug of War: Alabama’s Immigration Law and the 
Scope of State Power in Immigration, 64 ALA. L. REV. 155 (2012) (same). 
 150. See, e.g., S. B. 1070, 50th Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 2012) (“The legislature declares that 
the intent of this act is to make attrition through enforcement the public policy . . . to discourage 
and deter the unlawful entry and presence of aliens . . . .”); see generally Kobach, supra note 140. 
 151. Kobach, supra note 140, at 156. 
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unwelcoming message directed at unlawful immigrants; the second is 
a contingently welcoming message directed at the federal 
government—fix the problem or we will.152 
III. IMMIGRATION STRUCTURALISM 
For now, at least, not much has been accomplished at the federal 
level to fix the problem of unlawful immigration.153 At the same time, 
the federal administration has judicially lobbied to preserve a federal 
monopoly over immigration enforcement.154 More specifically, the 
administration has taken the extraordinary measure of suing to enjoin 
subfederal restrictionist measures on preemption grounds, arguing 
that these initiatives are preempted by congressional statutes and/or 
executive enforcement policies. 
The disjunctive “or” was typified in several of the administration’s 
challenges to Arizona’s S.B. 1070, heard by the Supreme Court in 
Arizona v. United States. More specifically: 
• Section 3 of S.B. 1070 makes unlawful the “willful failure 
to complete or carry an alien registration document . . . in 
violation of” federal registration laws.155 The administration 
argued that this section was field preempted, in part, 
because the State cannot “claim the right to punish aliens 
who are not registered but who the Executive Branch has 
decided not to prosecute based on important 
 
 152. See, e.g., Press Release, Speaker Hubbard Responds to Effort to Overturn New 
Immigration Law (July 8, 2011) (“If the federal government won’t enforce its own laws and 
protect Alabama, we must protect ourselves.”); Press Release, SC on the Brink of Passing 
Arizona-Style Illegal Immigration Law (June 21, 2011) (“If Washington refuses to effectively 
support our law enforcement officers by enforcing immigration laws, it is left up to the states to 
stand up and do what is right.”). 
 153. Though deportation levels are reportedly at an all-time high, the 400,000 or so per year 
that are removed is but a very small fraction of the unlawfully present population. See Dep’t of 
Homeland Sec., Immigration and Customs Enforcement, Annual Report, Immigration 
Enforcement Actions: 2011 (Sept. 2012) (providing deportation statistics). It also bears noting 
that the removal statistics may be inflated as compared to prior years due to variances in the 
way removals have been counted. See Steven Dinan, Deportation Statistics Said to be Inflated, 
WASH. TIMES (Aug. 23, 2012), http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/ 2012/aug/23/deportation-
statistics-said-to-be-inflated/. 
 154. See, e.g., Brief of Amici Curiae State of Michigan et al. in Support of Defendants-
Appellants at 6, Arizona v. United States, 641 F.3d 339 (9th Cir. 2011) (No. 10-16645) 
[hereinafter Brief for Michigan] (deploring the Executive Branch’s challenge to Arizona Senate 
Bill 1070 as seeking to prolong a “regulatory scheme whereby the Executive branch may 
continue to selectively enforce—or selectively not enforce—the laws enacted by Congress”). 
 155. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 11-1509(A) (West 2013); see also 8 U.S.C.A. §§ 1304(e), 
1306(a) (West 2013) (federal registration laws incorporated by reference). 
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considerations consistent with the INA.”156 The Court 
agreed. Though principally focused on Congress’s intent, 
the Court also endorsed the administration’s enforcement 
argument, stating that, were Section 3 “to come into force, 
the State would have the power to bring criminal charges 
against individuals for violating a federal law even in 
circumstances where federal officials . . . determine that 
prosecution would frustrate federal policies.”157 
• Section 6 of S.B. 1070 provides that a state officer, “without 
a warrant, may arrest a person if the officer has probable 
cause to believe . . . [the person] has committed any public 
offense that makes [him] removable from the United 
States.”158 The federal administration argued that this 
section was obstacle preempted, in part because it 
“empowers state and local officers to pursue and detain a 
person . . . without regard to federal priorities or even 
specific federal enforcement determinations.”159 Again, the 
Court agreed, explaining that the state law “could be 
exercised without any input from the Federal Government 
about whether an arrest is warranted in a particular case,” 
thus “allow[ing] the State to achieve its own immigration 
policy.”160 
• Section 2(B) of S.B. 1070 requires state officers to make a 
“reasonable attempt . . . to determine the immigration 
status” of any person they stop, detain, or arrest on some 
other non-immigration related basis if “reasonable 
suspicion exists that the person is an alien and is 
unlawfully present in the United States.”161 The 
administration argued that Section 2(B) was preempted 
because in every instance it “‘stands as an obstacle to the 
accomplishment’ of the federal requirement of 
cooperation and the full effectuation of the enforcement 
judgment and discretion Congress has vested in the 
 
 156. Brief for the United States, supra note 31, at 15. 
 157. Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2503. 
 158. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13–3883(A)(5) (West 2013). 
 159. Brief for the United States, supra note 31, at 53. 
 160. Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2506. 
 161. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 11-1051(B) (West 2013). 
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Executive Branch under the INA.”162 “By insisting 
indiscriminately on enforcement in all cases,” the 
administration claimed, Section 2(B) forbids subfederal 
officers from “adhering to the enforcement judgments and 
discretion of the federal Executive Branch.”163 This time, 
however, the Court was not convinced.164 Though the court 
recognized that Section 2(B) “does not allow state officers 
to consider federal enforcement priorities in deciding 
whether to contact ICE about someone they have 
detained,” this was of little significance since Congress 
statutorily “encouraged the sharing of information about 
possible immigration violations.”165 
Of course, there is no dispute that congressional statutes preempt 
subfederal laws when a sufficient conflict exists. Congress may also 
statutorily preempt the field of immigration enforcement, should 
Congress deem it appropriate to do so.166 But, as I argue in this Part, 
the very availability of these legislative outlets cautions against 
allowing nonbinding executive policies to create preemptive conflicts 
that otherwise may not exist. As reflected above, the Arizona Court 
sent mixed messages on this score and did so without sensitivity to 
separation of powers norms.167 The Court’s jurisprudence outside of 
 
 162. Brief for the United States, supra note 31, at 50 (citations omitted) (quoting Hines v. 
Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941)); see also id. at 16 (stating that the administration welcomes 
subfederal assistance, “provided that they work ‘cooperat[ively]’ with federal officers toward 
the goals and priorities set by the Executive Branch, as Congress has specified in the INA itself” 
(alteration in original) (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1357(g)(10)(B) (2006))). 
 163. Id. 
 164. See generally David Martin, Reading Arizona, 98 VA. L. REV. 41 (2012) (noting a 
potential inconsistency in the Court’s treatment of the administration’s enforcement-
preemption argument). For thoughtful attempts to reconcile the Court’s potentially inconsistent 
holdings in Arizona, see id.; Cox, Enforcement Redundancy, supra note 7, (manuscript at 29–
30). 
 165. Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2496; see also 8 U.S C.A. § 1644 (West 2013) (instructing that “no 
State or local government entity may be prohibited, or in any way restricted, from sending to or 
receiving from [ICE] information regarding the immigration status, lawful or unlawful, of an 
alien in the United States.”). 
 166. Of course, it will not always be clear whether Congress intends exclusive federal 
enforcement. Still, it can be inferred based on the same tools that courts normally look to in 
discerning Congress’s intent—e.g., statutory text, context, and legislative history (for those so 
inclined). Cf. Buckman Co. v. Plaintiffs’ Legal Comm., 531 U.S. 341, 352 (2001) (holding that 
“clear evidence” exists to support the idea that Congress intended for the Medical Devices 
Amendment to be “enforced exclusively by the Federal Government”); Crosby v. Nat’l Foreign 
Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 373 (2000) (reasoning that in order to determine whether or not 
Congress intends to have exclusive enforcement power over a federal statute, courts must look 
to the “statute as a whole and identif[y] its purpose and intended effects”). 
 167. At times the Arizona Court stressed Congress’s intent, and at other times the 
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the immigration context suggests a similar ambivalence or inattention 
to whether nonbinding executive policies can preempt state law.168 
Unsettled questions thus persist over which government institution 
has the relative power to do what. In addressing that question, this 
Part argues in favor of an interdimensional approach that utilizes 
preemption doctrine to directly safeguard federalism and to indirectly 
safeguard separation of powers.169 
A. Safeguarding Federalism 
For better or worse, Congress has not directly responded to the 
subfederal restrictionist initiatives at the center of the debate. In a 
recent account, Pratheepan Gulasekaram and Karthick 
Ramakrishnan attributed this failing mostly to the work of a minority 
coalition actively seeking to block legislation reform for the very 
purpose of justifying and normalizing subfederal self-help measures.170 
 
administration’s enforcement priorities. See supra notes 155−60 and accompanying text. Justice 
Alito, in his concurring and dissenting opinion in Arizona, rightly distinguished between 
Congress’s and the Executive’s policies—making plain that only the former could have 
preemptive effect. The Arizona majority opinion, however, seemed to place little if any weight 
on this distinction. Posner, supra note 110 (observing that the Arizona majority found certain 
provisions of S.B. 1070 preempted, not because it conflicts with federal law, but because it 
“conflicts with the president’s policy”). 
 168. Compare Buckman, 531 U.S. 341 (holding that state-law fraud-on-the-FDA claims 
were conflict preempted by the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, owing in part to the 
disruption that such claims would have on the federal administration’s enforcement of the Act), 
with Barclays Bank PLC v. Franchise Tax Bd., 512 U.S. 298 (1994) (rejecting claim that 
nonbinding executive foreign-commerce policies preempted state law). Since Buckman was 
cited approvingly in Arizona, see Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2502–03, it is worth pausing to consider 
Buckman’s relevance to immigration enforcement preemption. As an initial matter, Buckman 
did not raise or address the type of separation of powers concerns at play in the immigration 
preemption context because there was no finding that the agency was underenforcing fraud on 
the agency, much less on a systemic scale. See generally Buckman, 531 U.S. 341. In any event, 
the Buckman Court seemed to vacillate between two views. At times the Court stressed how the 
statutory scheme preempted the state cause of action. See, e.g., id. at 352 (finding “clear 
evidence that Congress intended” that the statutory scheme be “enforced exclusively by the 
Federal Government” (emphasis added)). At other times, however, the Court suggested that 
preemption obtained because the state cause of action conflicted with the administration’s 
“responsibility to police fraud consistently with [its] judgment and objectives.” Id. at 350. 
Undoubtedly, both views played a role in the Court’s decision. Still, it is unclear whether the 
finding of conflict with the administration’s enforcement discretion would have been sufficient 
to trigger preemption without also finding that Congress “clearly” intended that discretion to be 
exclusive. Id. at 352. 
 169. These ideas are also applicable beyond the immigration context, but immigration is my 
principal focus here. 
 170. See generally Pratheepan Gulasekaram & Karthick Ramakrishnan, Immigration 
Federalism: A Reappraisal, N.Y.U. L. REV. (forthcoming Dec. 2013) [hereinafter Gulasekaram 
& Ramakrishnan, A Reappraisal]; Karthick Ramakrishnan & Pratheepan Gulasekaram, The 
Importance of the Political in Immigration Federalism, 44 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1431 (2013) [hereinafter 
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Be that as it may, Congress has not enacted any ex post laws that 
expressly preempt or save the subfederal regulations at issue.171 In 
seeking to resolve the putative federal-state conflicts, courts are thus 
guessing at what Congress may have intended in pre-existing federal 
statutes.172 To be sure, this juristic exercise is not unique to 
immigration; courts are often tasked with reading the tea leaves of 
Congress’s preemptive intent (and a usually fictitious one at that).173 
The plaguing question, however, is whether special substantive or 
methodological rules apply—or should apply—in the immigration 
preemption context. Though the Court has sent mixed signals, the 
general call from the academy seems to resound in favor of special 
preemption rules.174 But, as I argue here, we should insist instead on 
normalizing the analysis.175 Special rules in favor of immigration 
preemption unnecessarily and improvidently threaten the liberty-
enhancing values of federalism. This concern is only exacerbated by 
 
Ramakrishnan & Gulasekeram, The Importance of the Political]. 
 171. Cf. Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2501–02 (“[T]here is no doubt that Congress may withdraw 
specified powers from the States by enacting a statute containing an express preemption 
provision.”). 
 172. See, e.g., Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2492; Chamber of Commerce v. Whiting, 131 S. Ct. 1968 
(2011). 
 173. See Ernest A. Young, “The Ordinary Diet of the Law”: The Presumption Against 
Preemption in the Roberts Court, 2011 SUP. CT. REV. 253, 256 [hereinafter Young, The Ordinary 
Diet] (“[F]requent ambiguities in Congress’s preemptive intent afford the courts an opportunity 
to be more than just a mouthpiece for federal authority.”); see also Caleb Nelson, Preemption, 
86 VA. L. REV. 225, 277 (2000) (describing judicial attempts at identifying preemptive intent as 
“imaginative reconstruction”). 
 174. For a non-exhaustive sampling, see Karla Mari McKanders, The Constitutionality of 
State and Local Laws Targeting Immigrants, 31 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 579, 580–81 
(2009) (arguing that state and local governments should not regulate immigration); Michael A. 
Olivas, Preempting Preemption: Foreign Affairs, State Rights, and Alienage Classifications, 35 
VA. J. INT’L L. 217, 219–20 (1994) (resisting the claim that states should have a greater role than 
they currently do in regulating immigration); Pham, supra note 95, at 967 (arguing “that the 
immigration power is an exclusively federal power that must be exercised uniformly”); Michael 
J. Wishnie, Laboratories of Bigotry? Devolution of the Immigration Power, Equal Protection, 
and Federalism, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 493, 500 (2001) [hereinafter Wishnie, Laboratories of 
Bigotry] (arguing that “Congress’s 1996 effort to devolve its federal immigration power is 
constitutionally impermissible”). For a minority but growing academic position in favor of 
normalizing immigration federalism, see generally Huntington, supra note 139 (challenging the 
constitutional mandate of federal exclusivity over immigration); Rodriguez, The Significance of 
the Local, supra note 41, at 571 (arguing that “immigration regulation should be included in the 
list of quintessentially state interests”); Schuck, Taking Immigration Federalism Seriously, supra 
note 93 (making the case for a more robust role for states, in certain areas of immigration 
policy); Peter J. Spiro, In an Era of Demi-Sovereignties, 35 VA. J. INT’L L. 121 (1994) 
[hereinafter Spiro, Demi-Sovereignties] (arguing that the presumption of federal control over 
immigration no longer prevails). 
 175. For related projects in normalizing immigration federalism, see, for example, 
Rodriguez, The Significance of the Local, supra note 41; Huntington, supra note 139. 
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the potential failings in separation of powers outlined in Part II. 
As Ernest Young explains, “the enumerated limits of Congress’s 
powers now play an extremely limited role in preserving the federal 
balance.”176 Congress is generally free to regulate almost all aspects of 
daily life, resulting in a federalist system predominantly characterized 
by concurrent federal-state jurisdiction.177 The Supremacy Clause is 
the principal instrument for managing that regulatory overlap, where 
the federalism inquiry shifts from what “Congress can do” to what 
“Congress has done.”178 Enormous structural pressure thus comes to 
bear on preemption doctrine. The less forgiving the doctrine is for 
conflicts, the more states are squeezed of regulatory autonomy. In 
turn, as the states’ autonomy deflates, so too does their capacity to 
check and counterbalance federal action. Because preemption 
doctrine may be federalism’s last viable stronghold,179 Professor 
Young suggests approaching preemption questions in “ways that 
cohere with the broader concerns of constitutional federalism 
doctrine.”180 
These ideas translate in important ways for the ongoing 
subfederal immigration revolution. Insofar as the Court’s federalism 
doctrine has relegated state protection to the federal lawmaking 
process, it becomes all the more “critical that the Court fashion 
meaningful limits [1] on the preemptive scope of the legislation that 
Congress does enact and [2] on the ability of nonlegislative federal 
actors to extend that scope.”181 Yet, in the immigration context, 
precisely the opposite threatens to take hold: Federal statutes are 
 
 176. Young, The Ordinary Diet, supra note 173, at 306. 
 177. William W. Buzbee, Federalism Floors, Ceilings, and the Benefits of Federalism’s 
Institutional Diversity, in PREEMPTION CHOICE: THE THEORY, LAW, AND REALITY OF 
FEDERALISM’S CORE QUESTION 98, 101 (William W. Buzbee ed., 2008) (“Congress has 
repeatedly chosen to create regulatory schemes that call on a role for federal, state, and 
sometimes even local governments.”); Robert Schapiro, From Dualism To Polyphony, in 
PREEMPTION CHOICE: THE THEORY, LAW, AND REALITY OF FEDERALISM’S CORE QUESTION 
33, 41 (William W. Buzbee ed., 2008) (“Since 1937, overlapping state and federal regulation has 
become the norm, for many, if not most, subjects.”). 
 178. Young, The Ordinary Diet, supra note 173, at 321; see also Young, Executive 
Preemption, supra note 12, at 873 (“Preemption doctrine is a particularly important vehicle for 
promoting balance between national and state authority.”). 
 179. Young, The Ordinary Diet, supra note 173, at 306; see also Garrick B. Pursley, 
Preemption in Congress, 71 OHIO ST. L.J. 511, 513 (2010) (“[P]reemption may be the most 
important issue for modern federalism theory because it reallocates regulatory authority 
between the national and state governments.”). 
 180. Young, The Ordinary Diet, supra note 173, at 306. 
 181. Id. at 280. 
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expansively read to preempt state law, while nonlegislative executive 
policies are recognized as a conflict-generating preemptive source. 
Though this Article is mostly focused on executive preemption, the 
discussion below detours to contextualize that issue within 
immigration preemption doctrine more generally. 
1. Federal Exclusivity Principle 
It is now quite settled that the immigration power is exclusively 
federal. Yet nothing in the Constitution expressly says so.182 Indeed, 
our country’s first hundred years was characterized by state (not 
federal) immigration regulation.183 It was not until the close of the 
Nineteenth Century that federal exclusivity began to take hold in the 
field.184 Still—and critically—the exclusivity of the federal 
immigration power is definitionally contingent under existing Court 
precedent. Specifically, the Court has narrowly defined “immigration” 
laws to encompass regulations governing the admission and expulsion 
of noncitizens.185 Meanwhile, beyond those regulatory categories, 
federal and subfederal governments share concurrent authority over 
matters of “alienage,”186 which are residually defined as laws that 
touch upon noncitizens but do not amount to “immigration.”187 
Alienage laws are generally directed at the rights and burdens of 
noncitizens within the country’s interior. Common examples include 
 
 182. See Sarah H. Cleveland, Powers Inherent in Sovereignty: Indians, Aliens, Territories, 
and the Nineteenth Century Origins of Plenary Power over Foreign Affairs, 81 TEX. L. REV. 1, 
81–83 (2002) (noting that “[t]he constitutional text does not expressly address authority to 
regulate immigration”); Huntington, supra note 139, at 812 (outlining the implied sources of the 
constitutional power); Rodriguez, The Significance of the Local, supra note 41, at 611 
(“Nowhere in the Constitution is the federal government explicitly given exclusive power over 
immigration.”). 
 183. See, e.g., Gerald L. Neuman, The Lost Century of American Immigration Law, 93 
COLUM. L. REV. 1833 (1993) [hereinafter Neuman, The Lost Century] (investigating pre-1875 
immigration regulation). 
 184. See id. at 1886–93 (discussing the emergence of federal exclusivity in the field of 
immigration). 
 185. See, e.g., Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 522, 531 (1954) (“Policies pertaining to the entry of 
aliens and their right to remain here are . . . entrusted exclusively to Congress . . . .”); Truax v. 
Raich, 239 U.S. 33, 42 (1915) (“The authority to control immigration—to admit or exclude 
aliens—is vested solely in the Federal government.” (citations omitted)); see also DeCanas v. 
Bica, 424 U.S. 351, 355 (1976) (defining immigration law per se as “a determination of who 
should or should not be admitted into the country”). 
 186. See, e.g., Huntington, supra note 139, at 799 (“[S]tates and localities have some 
authority to enact alienage laws . . . .”). 
 187. See, e.g., Gabriel J. Chin & Marc L. Miller, The Unconstitutionality of State Regulation 
of Immigration through Criminal Law, 61 DUKE L.J. 251, 259–61, 263–64, 269 (2012) (defining 
“alienage” in opposition to “immigration”). 
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noncitizens’ eligibility for social welfare programs and selected 
occupations, limitations on noncitizens’ ability to own land, and 
noncitizen tax liabilities.188 
The conceptual divide between “immigration” and “alienage” laws 
generates two levels of sorting, both central to preemption. The first 
sorting involves the placement of subfederal regulations into the 
“immigration” or “alienage” bucket. Those falling in the former are 
thought to be constitutionally (or, “structurally”) preempted under 
the exclusivity principle.189 Meanwhile, those falling in the alienage 
bucket are subject to the more conventional conflict-sorting work of 
the preemption doctrine.190 Notorious complications attend both 
sorting functions. 
In regard to structural preemption, the conceptual divide between 
immigration and alienage laws is obscured in application. As 
explained by Cristina Rodriguez, “alienage classifications shade into 
immigration controls” insofar as subfederal policies that “dole out 
relatively negative or positive treatment” to noncitizens can influence 
migration decisions both nationally and subnationally.191 As similarly 
articulated by Adam Cox, “every rule that imposes duties on 
noncitizens . . . potentially influences noncitizens’ decisions about 
whether to enter or depart the United States . . . and potentially 
influences the way in which resident noncitizens live.”192 Many of the 
subfederal revolutionary laws at issue highlight this tension: 
Restrictionist laws embodying the “attrition-through-enforcement” 
philosophy are purposefully designed to encourage the self-
deportation of unauthorized immigrants; meanwhile, subfederal 
protectionist laws that provide sanctuary and benefits to immigrants 
offer a sense of welcome.193 Thus, though potentially dispositive, 
 
 188. See Legomsky, Immigration Law, supra note 81, at 256 (describing alienage laws); see 
generally A. PETER MUTHARIKA, THE ALIEN UNDER AMERICAN LAW (1981) (2 vols.). 
 189. See Huntington, supra note 139, at 813–14 (discussing structural preemption). 
 190. Chin & Miller, supra note 187, at 261. 
 191. Rodriguez, The Significance of the Local, supra note 41, at 618. 
 192. Adam B. Cox, Immigration Law’s Organizing Principles, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 341, 343 
(2008). 
 193. See Rodriguez, The Significance of the Local, supra note 41, at 618; see also Anil 
Kalhan, Immigration Enforcement and Federalism After Sept. 11, 2001, in IMMIGRATION, 
INTEGRATION, AND SECURITY: AMERICA AND EUROPE IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 181, 
183 (Ariane Chebel d’Appollonia & Simon Reich eds., 2008) (observing that “non-U.S. citizens 
are seeking and finding protection in state capitols and city halls” and that “[i]n some instances 
they are finding greater concern for rights and liberties in these locales than they have in 
Washington”). 
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characterizing subfederal regulations as either “immigration” or 
“alienage” is frustrated by the very nature of the inquiry and by the 
inescapable truth that subfederal regulations are usually a bit of 
both.194 
For regulations directed at unlawful immigrants, the Supreme 
Court has generally resolved doubts over this threshold sorting 
function in favor of the states.195 For example, in the landmark case 
DeCanas v. Bica,196 the Court upheld a California state law that 
criminalized the hiring of unauthorized immigrants.197 Though the 
Court noted that the “power to regulate immigration is 
unquestionably” an exclusive federal power, it also explained that a 
state law’s “purely speculative and indirect impact on immigration” 
does not render it “a constitutionally proscribed regulation of 
immigration.”198 And, more recently in Arizona and Chamber of 
Commerce v. Whiting,199 the Court functionally reinforced this 
principle when it treated Arizona’s restrictionist regulations as 
alienage laws notwithstanding the incidental migration effects these 
laws likely have on noncitizens.200 Indeed, the Court in Arizona 
approached S.B. 1070 as alienage law notwithstanding the bill’s 
legislatively expressed intent to make self-deportation the “public 
policy of all state and local government agencies in Arizona.”201 
 
 194. See Linda S. Bosniak, Membership, Equality, and the Difference that Alienage Makes, 
69 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1047, 1053–57 (1994) (“[T]o characterize the law [as either immigration or 
alienage] is to beg the question . . . .”); Hiroshi Motomura, Immigration and Alienage, 
Federalism and Proposition 187, 35 VA. J. INT’L L. 201, 203 (1994) (arguing that a distinction 
between immigration law and alienage law is “more formal than real” because of the overlap in 
practice). 
 195. For subfederal regulations impacting lawfully present immigrants, the Court seems to 
be far less deferential to states—so much so that it is probably fair to imply a presumption 
against the states. See Toll v. Moreno, 458 U.S. 1, 10−11 (1982) (finding preemption and holding 
invalid the University of Maryland’s policy of denying in-state status to non-immigrant aliens 
who hold valid G-4 visas); Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 376–80 (1971) (holding that 
state policies that deny welfare benefits to lawfully present resident aliens encroach on exclusive 
federal power over the entrance and residence of aliens); Traux v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33, 37 (1915) 
(finding an Arizona statute imposing limits on the employment of lawful residents to be 
preempted by federal law). 
 196. 424 U.S. 351 (1975). 
 197. See generally id. 
 198. Id. at 355–56. 
 199. 131 S. Ct. 1968 (2011). 
 200. See generally Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492 (2012); Whiting, 131 S. Ct. 1968. 
 201. S.B. 1070, § 1, 49th Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 2010) (“The legislature declares that the 
intent of this act is to make attrition through enforcement the public policy of all state and local 
government agencies in Arizona.”). 
RUBENSTEIN 10.20.2013 (DO NOT DELETE) 10/21/2013  10:40 PM 
2013] IMMIGRATION STRUCTURALISM 121 
2. Curbing the Shadow of Federal Exclusivity 
To the extent that subfederal laws are sorted into the alienage 
bucket, the next sorting function determines whether—in the zone of 
concurrent federal-state jurisdiction—subfederal laws are trumped or 
displaced by conflicting federal law. This sorting provides an 
opportunity for conventional applications of the preemption doctrine. 
Yet here, the exclusivity principle continues to cast a shadow.202 
A strong commitment to federal exclusivity over immigration 
leads to heavy doses of skepticism toward any subfederal 
restrictionist measure relating to noncitizens.203 That is because, as 
noted, almost all such laws impact migration decisions at some level.204 
This skepticism, in turn, has led some courts and commentators to 
“place a thumb on the scale in favor of preemption.”205 The shadow of 
exclusivity also makes obstacle and field preemption more 
capacious.206 Further, the exclusivity principle tends to obscure the 
 
 202. See Chin & Miller, supra note 187, at 259–60, 274–76; Huntington, supra note 139, at 
792 (“[C]oncluding that the Constitution precludes state and local authority over pure 
immigration law casts a long shadow on any state or local conduct concerning immigration, even 
conduct that falls short of pure immigration law.”); Rodriguez, The Significance of the Local, 
supra note 41, at 62. This shadowing effect was typified most recently in United States v. 
Alabama, 691 F.3d 1269, 1294 (11th Cir. 2012) (characterizing Alabama as seeking to exercise 
“expulsion power” through a provision of its immigration law). Kerry Abrams also suggests that 
this dynamic was at play in Arizona in a way that allowed the Court to avoid “the thorny 
question of the scope of the Executive’s power in the immigration context.” See Kerry Abrams, 
Plenary Power Preemption, 99 VA. L. REV. 601, 606 (2013). 
 203. See Huntington, supra note 139, at 826 (“If we think authority over pure immigration 
law is structurally committed to the federal government alone, then we are deeply skeptical of 
any state and local conduct related to immigration and aliens . . . .”). 
 204.  See supra note 191 and accompanying text. 
 205. See Rodriguez, The Significance of the Local, supra note 41, at 621 (noting, but arguing 
against, that approach). For thumb-on-the-scale approaches, see, for example, Ingrid v. Eagly, 
Local Immigration Prosecution: A Study of Arizona Before SB 1070, 58 UCLA L. REV. 1749, 
1783−84 (2011) (arguing that Arizona is functionally regulating immigration law and policy); 
Fan, supra note 134, at 1273, 1275, 1277; Hiroshi Motomura, The Discretion that Matters, supra 
note 120, at 1858 (“For the purpose of preemption analysis, it is essential to recognize that the 
practical consequences of a state or local decision to arrest a potentially removable noncitizen is 
the making of immigration law itself.”); see also Ernest A. Young, The Puzzling Persistence of 
Dual Federalism, NOMOS LIV: LIBERTY (forthcoming) (manuscript at 34) (on file with the 
author) [hereinafter Young, The Puzzling Persistence] (noting that the Court in Arizona 
“stressed ordinary preemption principles, not doctrines of federal exclusivity, although it does 
seem fair to say that the Court applied those doctrines with a pro-preemption thumb on the 
scale”). 
 206. See Rodriguez, The Significance of the Local, supra note 41, at 621 (“Because it has 
become so enmeshed in the courts’ doctrinal rhetoric, exclusivity has given rise to very strong 
versions of obstacle and field preemption according to which states are not regarded as having 
meaningful interests in controlling immigration.”); see also Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 
2492, 2510 (2012) (holding that three sections of S.B. 1070 were likely preempted). But cf. 
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Supremacy Clause’s limiting prescriptions. Many—including the 
federal administration—suggest that the Executive’s enforcement 
discretion can itself suffice to preempt state law or may otherwise 
shape ex post the preemptive scope of congressional enactments.207 
The cumulative effect is (1) a type of presumption in favor of 
preemption; (2) a Court less tolerant of federal-state conflict; and (3) 
an expansion of the types of conflicts (to wit, nonbinding executive 
policies) that will count toward preemption. 
For those that favor a subfederal immigration role, one possible 
doctrinal response to the shadowing effect of the exclusivity principle 
is to eviscerate exclusivity itself.208 That is, for any number of related 
reasons, we might simply take a sledgehammer to the exclusivity 
canon. First, the Constitution does not obviously require federal 
exclusivity; indeed, both the federal and state levels of government 
acted otherwise for the first century of our history.209 Second, the 
exclusivity principle was conceived in an era when there was a 
“perceived need to have a single, strong sovereign manage foreign 
affairs.”210 But as Peter Spiro and others have argued, the foreign 
affairs rationale for exclusivity is a historically contingent artifact with 
far less purchase today.211 Third, exclusivity is not functionally 
 
Whiting, 131 S. Ct. at 1985 (upholding LAWA, and noting that “implied preemption analysis 
does not justify a freewheeling judicial inquiry into whether a state statute is in tension with 
federal objectives” (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 207. See, e.g., Chin & Miller, supra note 187, at 260; Fan, supra note 134, at 1272–73; Pham, 
supra note 95, at 967–68. 
 208. See Rodriguez, The Significance of the Local, supra note 41, at 572–73 (“Federal 
exclusivity was neither a matter of original practice, nor is it specified in the Constitution.”); see 
also Huntington, supra note 139, at 794 (“Although conventional wisdom embraces a structural 
preemption view of federal immigration authority, the text of the Constitution, the institutions 
created by the Constitution, and historical practice all support a statutory preemption view.”); 
Spiro, Demi-Sovereignties, supra note 174, at 155 (arguing that exclusivity is no longer necessary 
in a world where subfederal actors are gaining increased recognition). 
 209. Rodriguez, The Significance of the Local, supra note 41, at 572, 611. 
 210. Id. at 572. 
 211. See, e.g., Spiro, Demi-Sovereignties, supra note 174, at 134 (“To the extent that foreign 
relations no longer remains an exclusive federal responsibility, the states should be afforded 
substantially greater latitude to deal with illegal immigration as a local problem.”); id. at 171 
(“Subfederal activity in the area [of immigration], however, is no longer likely to compromise 
national interests.”); Young, The Puzzling Persistence, supra note 205, at 44 (“The persistent 
nostalgia for exclusive zones of national power over areas like foreign affairs or immigration, 
then, remains puzzling.”). For similar expressions not addressed directly at immigration, see, for 
example, Jack L. Goldsmith, Federal Courts, Foreign Affairs, and Federalism, 83 VA. L REV. 
1617, 1674 (1997) (“To the extent that central governments are unable or unwilling to redress 
local needs and interests, state and local governments have been doing so unilaterally in both 
the economic and political realms.”); Julian Ku, Gubernatorial Foreign Policy, 115 YALE L.J. 
2380, 2414 (2006) (describing “an emerging system of gubernatorial foreign policy characterized 
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necessary.212 Canada and Germany, for example, allow their respective 
subnational units to control certain aspects of immigration.213 Fourth, 
our existing regulatory landscape eschews federal exclusivity: 
Congress increasingly devolves immigration-related authority to 
subfederal governments and subfederal governments increasingly 
regulate the affairs of noncitizens.214 Finally—and most critically—
abandoning the exclusivity principle would not absolve the federal 
government of its primacy in immigration. Congress can always trump 
or displace subfederal law as it deems appropriate to do so.215 
In my estimation, this is a formidable assault that well serves the 
ultimate objective of safeguarding federalism. But completely 
discarding the exclusivity principle may be unnecessarily ambitious. In 
the words of the Court, exclusive federal control over immigration 
“has become about as firmly imbedded in the legislative and judicial 
tissues of our body politic as any aspect of our government.”216 My 
approach here is thus more tailored and modest: it honors the 
principle of exclusivity but limits its gravitational reach. The reasons 
outlined above for abolishing exclusivity work equally well for this 
more limited purpose, without upsetting foundational precedent. 
 
 
 
 
by governors exercising independent decision-making power over matters affecting the foreign 
policy of the entire United States”); see also, e.g., Brian Hocking, Introduction to FOREIGN 
RELATIONS AND FEDERAL STATES 1, 3 (Brian Hocking ed., 1993) (“The notion of a hierarchy 
of political authority, with central government acting as the effective gatekeeper between 
national communities and their international environment, is outdated” because of “changes in 
the domestic and international environments.”). 
 212. See Huntington, supra note 139, at 816 (“[T]he institutional structure of the 
Constitution does not require federal exclusivity, as a functional matter.”). 
 213. Neuman, The Lost Century, supra note 183, at 1840 n.34 (observing that federal 
exclusivity “is neither natural nor inevitable in United States federalism or in federalism 
generally, as illustrated by Canada and Germany, where federal sub-units still have immigration 
responsibilities”); Spiro, Demi-Sovereignties, supra note 174, at 122 (arguing that federal 
exclusivity “is not a structural necessity” for the purposes of foreign relations). 
 214. Stumpf, supra note 84, at 1600–13 (discussing how congressional devolution to states 
has loosened the federal grip on exclusivity); see also Rodriguez, The Significance of the Local, 
supra note 41, at 610 (asserting that the contemporary practice of states undermines the notion 
of federal exclusivity). 
 215. Huntington, supra note 139, at 792; Rodriguez, The Significance of the Local, supra 
note 41, at 572, 620; Spiro, Demi-Sovereignties, supra note 174, at 123. 
 216. Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 522, 531 (1954). 
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a. Presumption in Favor of Preemption? 
As noted, one shadowing effect of the exclusivity principle is that 
it might place a thumb on the scale in favor of preemption when 
Congress’s intent is unspecified or ambiguous.217 This approach finds 
theoretical support in the idea that Congress legislates against the 
backdrop of exclusivity, and thus presumptively intends to displace 
subfederal law in the absence of countervailing evidence.218 As Viet 
Dinh explains, “[t]he background context against which Congress 
legislates may change in ways that make federal displacement of state 
law not an extraordinary but an expected action.”219 
In the immigration context, however, the exclusivity principle is 
both empirically and normatively suspect as a background legislative 
convention. First, as noted, Congress has increasingly devolved power 
to the states to cooperate in immigration enforcement220 and to make 
localized decisions about welfare rights and benefits.221 Moreover, 
Congress has increasingly incorporated state crime and punishment as 
grounds for excluding and deporting noncitizens.222 This legislative 
behavior undermines any empirical claim that Congress believes (or 
intends) that the power to regulate immigrants is invariably federal. 
 
 217. See Rodriguez, The Significance of the Local, supra note 41, at 621 (“[T]he availability 
of constitutional preemption, and its statutory corollary of field preemption, leads courts to 
define conflict between state and federal laws broadly and to put a thumb on the scale in favor 
of preemption.”). 
 218. Id. at 623; see also Ramakrishnan & Gulasekaram, The Importance of the Political, 
supra note 170, at 1442 (“[I]n the case of immigration policy, the status quo of legislative 
inaction is not the same as having a blank policy slate on immigration.”). 
 219. Dinh, supra note 65, at 2101. 
 220. See 8 U.S.C.A. § 1357(g) (West 2013) (specifying immigration enforcement functions 
that may be delegated to subfederal officials). 
 221. See Balanced Budget Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105–33, §§ 5301–04, 5306, 5562–63, 111 
Stat. 251 (1997); see also Stumpf, supra note 84, at 1586 (discussing the devolution of “federal 
power to the states to deny benefits to immigrants”). 
 222. See Stumpf, supra note 84, at 1593 (explaining how “state statutory definitions of crime 
play a major part in determining whether a federal deportability ground will apply to a 
conviction”). For some of the federal law’s expansion of crime-related grounds for deportation, 
see Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, § 440(e), 110 
Stat. 1214, 1277–78 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43) (2000)) (expanding 
“aggravated felony” to include certain non-violent crimes); Immigration and Nationality 
Technical Corrections Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-416, § 222, 108 Stat. 4305, 4320–22 (codified 
as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43) (2000)) (expanding “aggravated felony” definition to 
include certain lesser crimes); Immigration Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-649, § 501(a)(3), 104 
Stat. 4978, 5048 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43) (2000)) (amending definition of 
“aggravated felony” to include a “crime of violence”); Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988 (Drug 
Kingpin Act), Pub. L. No. 100-690, § 7342, 102 Stat. 4181, 4469–70 (codified as amended at 8 
U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43) (2000)) (defining “aggravated felony” deportation grounds to include 
crimes of murder, drug trafficking, and firearms trafficking). 
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In any event, it is quite beside the point whether Congress actually 
legislates with the exclusivity principle in mind, or even whether for 
normative reasons we should presume Congress to be doing so. An 
affirmative answer to either suggestion would only establish that 
Congress intends to preempt state immigration laws—i.e., laws 
concerning the admission and expulsion of noncitizens—which is the 
outer limit of the Court’s exclusivity principle.223 As a background 
legislative convention, therefore, the exclusivity principle should do 
no additional work beyond what it affords during the first sorting 
function of structural preemption. 
Both empirically and normatively, it would seem that if any 
interpretive canon is to apply in the zone of concurrent jurisdiction it 
should be the conventional presumption against preemption—a 
judicially described “cornerstone” of federalism in effect during the 
enactment periods of the immigration statutes at issue.224 The effect of 
the anti-preemption presumption resolves doubts about Congress’s 
intent in favor of the states, thus placing a greater burden on Congress 
to actually decide issues of preemption.225 Though not speaking to 
immigration in particular, Professor Clark argues that the canon’s 
effect of channeling preemption decisions to Congress—and away 
from the courts—is consistent with, if not required by, the Supremacy 
Clause.226 Roderick Hills also defends the canon on normative 
grounds, explaining how the anti-preemption presumption serves to 
effectuate “an open and vigorous [preemption] debate on the floor of 
 
 223. See supra notes 185−87 and accompanying text (discussing the scope of the exclusivity 
principle). 
 224. See Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947) (noting that there is a 
presumption against federal preemption of state laws unless “that was the clear and manifest 
purpose of Congress” (citations omitted)); see also Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 565 (2009) 
(describing the presumption as a “cornerstone[] of our pre-emption jurisprudence”). But cf. 
Dinh, supra note 65, at 2096 (arguing that the “constitutional text, structure, and history does 
not support the application of the [presumption] in all contexts”); Nelson, supra note 173, at 291 
(noting that it would be improper for courts to apply an “artificial presumption against 
preemption” to constrain “federal statutory provisions that plainly do manifest an inten[t] to 
supplant state law” (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 225. See, e.g., Young, The Ordinary Diet, supra note 173, at 275 (describing the presumption 
against preemption as a “thumb on the scale representing the value of state autonomy”); see 
also Matthew C. Stephenson, The Price of Public Action: Constitutional Doctrine and the 
Judicial Manipulation of Legislative Enactment Costs, 118 YALE L.J. 2, 36 (2008) (describing 
how clear-statement rules enforce constitutional values by increasing the enactment costs of 
particular types of legislation). 
 226. See Clark, Separation of Powers, supra note 12, at 1427–29 (claiming that the clear-
statement requirement essentially requires Congress to decide preemption questions). 
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Congress.”227 William Eskridge favors the presumption because it 
offsets delegation pathologies generated by the cumbersome 
legislative process.228 Meanwhile, Professor Young endorses the anti-
preemption presumption as a “compensating adjustment” for 
federalism, to help offset the Court’s general reluctance to police or 
limit the bounds of federal power.229 
My theory of immigration structuralism builds on these ideas to 
explain why the anti-preemption presumption should apply in the 
immigration context (or, at least why a presumption in favor of 
preemption should not). In particular, the anti-preemption 
presumption offers a type of compensating adjustment not only for 
federalism, but also for potential failings along the separation of 
powers dimension. As explained in Part II, the Executive’s capacious 
policymaking discretion over the sizable undocumented immigrant 
population arises from Congress’s de facto delegation.230 It is a 
phenomenon of immigration governance that is virtually immune 
from judicial policing under existing separation of powers doctrine.231 
And, indeed, there may be much to fear from an overly meddlesome 
court on this horizontal power-sharing issue.232 Thus, rather than insist 
upon direct separation of powers judicial review, we might seek 
refuge in an anti-preemption presumption, which operates vertically 
to help maintain a check on federal overreaching. A presumption in 
favor of preemption, by contrast, makes preemption of subfederal law 
too easy. Given the judicial concessions already made on separation 
of powers issues (most notably, the nondelegation doctrine) and on 
federalism (most notably, the demise of dual federalism and the 
enumerated powers doctrine), it seems dangerous to invite further 
 
 227. Roderick M. Hills, Jr., Against Preemption: How Federalism Can Improve the National 
Legislative Process, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 28 (2007) [hereinafter Hills, Against Preemption]. 
 228. William Eskridge, Jr., Vetogates, Chevron, Preemption, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1441, 
1470–71 (2008). 
 229. Ernest A. Young, Making Federalism, supra note 135, at 1848–50. 
 230. See supra notes 99−118 and accompanying text (discussing immigration separation of 
powers as between Congress and the Executive). 
 231. Cf. Cox & Rodriguez, supra note 85, at 538 (“[D]isciplining prosecutorial discretion 
through the courts is extremely difficult. Add to this general difficulty the plenary power 
tradition and courts’ general reluctance to step into anything connected to foreign affairs, and 
this sort of correction seems even less likely.”); see also Reno v. Am.-Arab Anti-Discrimination 
Comm., 525 U.S. 471, 489–92 (1999) (rejecting a claim of selective immigration prosecution and 
noting the particular difficulties with “invad[ing] a special province of the Executive” over its 
prosecutorial discretion). 
 232. Cf. Heckler v. Chaney, 420 U.S. 821, 831–32 (1985) (explaining how the courts are ill-
equipped to discern inappropriate uses of prosecutorial discretion). 
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recessions for preemption, which may be federalism’s most promising 
salvage. 
Outwardly, at least, the Court has rejected the bait for a 
presumption in favor of immigration preemption. In Arizona, for 
example, the Court affirmatively noted that it would not assume that 
“‘the historic police powers of the States’ [were] superseded ‘unless 
that was the clear and manifest purpose of Congress.’”233 Of course, 
the doctrinal dissonance surrounding the anti-preemption 
presumption is well-recognized: When it comes to applying the canon, 
what the Court says is not necessarily (or even usually) what the 
Court does.234 Even if that is the case, there remains some conceptual 
distance to travel between an underenforced presumption against 
preemption, on the one hand, and a presumption in favor of 
preemption, on the other. The anti-preemption presumption, although 
underenforced, offers some conceptual drag, and acts as a reminder 
that Congress is the primary institution for making preemption 
decisions. 
b. Executive Immigration “Law”? 
The shadowing effect of federal exclusivity also leads to 
fundamental misconceptions about the Executive’s authority to 
preempt state law. Two related ideas feed the confusion. The first idea 
conceives of federal enforcement discretion as the yin to the 
legislative yang—together inextricably forming our operational 
“immigration law.” Under this view, “the discretion inherent in the 
federal immigration scheme . . . is as much a part of the law of 
immigration as the relevant statutory text.”235 This idea was reflected 
 
 233. Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2501 (2012) (quoting Rice v. Sante Fe 
Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947)); see also DeCanas v. Bica 424 U.S. 351, 357 (1976) 
(requiring a showing that Congress had a “clear and manifest purpose” to preempt state 
regulation). In Whiting, the Court did not expressly mention the presumption against 
preemption, but concluded that petitioners had not met their burden of meeting the “high 
threshold” necessary for implied conflict preemption. Chamber of Commerce v. Whiting, 131 S. 
Ct. 1968, 1980 (2011). 
 234. See, e.g., S. Candice Hoke, Preemption Pathologies and Civic Republican Values, 71 
B.U. L. REV. 685, 733 (1991) (describing the Court’s approach to the presumption as “fickle”); 
Thomas W. Merrill, supra note 69, at 741 (remarking that “the presumption against preemption 
is honored as much in the breach as in observance”). Indeed, in Arizona, Justice Alito criticized 
the majority’s failure to give expression to the anti-preemption presumption in its treatment of 
Section 5(C) of S.B. 1070. Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2530 (Alito, J., concurring in part and dissenting 
in part). 
 235. Chin & Miller, supra note 187, at 260; see also Fan, supra note 134, at 1272 (“Executive 
enforcement policy play[s] a crucial role in shaping the law in reality.”); Motomura, Immigration 
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in Arizona, where the Court noted that a “principal feature of the 
removal system is the broad discretion exercised by immigration 
officials.”236 The second idea stresses federal exclusivity over foreign 
affairs, in which the Executive’s enforcement decisions are thought to 
play an essential part.237 This idea also found expression in Arizona, 
where the Court noted that the “dynamic nature of relations with 
other countries requires the Executive Branch to ensure that 
enforcement policies are consistent with this Nation’s foreign 
policy.”238 
Although these expressions harbor elements of truth, neither 
supports an executive power to preempt subfederal law. 
Understanding why requires appreciation for the critical distinctions 
drawn in the Supremacy Clause. Apart from the Constitution itself, 
only “Laws” made pursuant thereof and “Treaties” can preempt state 
law.239 
Nonbinding executive enforcement policies do not neatly qualify 
as “Laws,” much less are they made “in pursuance of” the 
Constitution. That the phrase “Laws . . . made in pursuance [of the 
Constitution]” was intended to refer to statutes seems abundantly 
clear not only from the context in which the phrase appears, but also 
from its drafting history. Before being revised by the Committee of 
Detail, the phrase in question read: “The Acts of the Legislature of the 
United States made in pursuance of this Constitution . . . shall be the 
Supreme law of the several States.”240 Absent any indication to the 
contrary, there is no reason to believe that the change from “Acts of 
 
Outside the Law, supra note 5, at 2064 (“[D]iscretion seems unusually important in immigration 
law, because unlawful immigrant activity enjoys acceptance in many circles, and because rates of 
investigation, detection, apprehension, and prosecution are extremely low.”). 
 236. Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2499. 
 237. See Fan, supra note 134, at 1272 (“Executive discretion balances sensitive foreign 
affairs considerations that the constitutional structure entrusts to the national executive.”); see 
also Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429, 432 (1968) (explaining that the federal government has 
exclusive power over foreign affairs); United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 
319–21 (1936) (discussing the President’s role in foreign affairs); Pham, supra note 95, at 968 
(“[T]he immigration power must be exercised uniformly because of the need for the nation to 
speak with one voice on foreign policy matters.”); cf. Stumpf, supra note 84, at 1565 (“When 
courts perceive the subnational effort as a regulation of foreign policy, the space for local 
regulation narrows.”). 
 238. Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2499. 
 239. U.S. CONST. art. VI. 
 240. THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 183 (Max Farrand ed., 2d. ed. 
1937) (emphasis added). 
RUBENSTEIN 10.20.2013 (DO NOT DELETE) 10/21/2013  10:40 PM 
2013] IMMIGRATION STRUCTURALISM 129 
the Legislature” to “Laws” was anything other than stylistic.241 
To be sure, as both Peter Strauss and Thomas Merrill propose, we 
might capitalize on the Committee’s drafting edit to accommodate 
more liberal interpretations of what qualifies as “Laws . . . made in 
pursuance [of the Constitution].”242 But, as even they concede, doing 
so would have to be for functional reasons243 that in my estimation 
(and maybe even theirs) are not justified for nonbinding executive 
policies.244 It is a truism that the Framers did not foresee our modern 
government, and for that reason we might rightly be skeptical of 
committing ourselves to their original intent. Still, however, we should 
resist a reductionist approach that would include all federal action 
within the scope of the Supremacy Clause simply because the Court, 
for functional reasons, has deemed it appropriate to include some 
types of unconventional lawmaking within the Clause’s ambit.245 
Perhaps a stronger case for executive preemption could be made 
if the enforcement policies at issue were more Law-like; that is, if they 
were binding in the way that Laws are.246 In other contexts, the 
Court—albeit without any real analysis—has recognized the 
preemptive effect of agency regulations that have the “force of law.”247 
 
 241. Clark, Separation of Powers, supra note 12, at 1354–55. 
 242. Merrill, supra note 69, at 761−64 (favoring a functional interpretation of the Supremacy 
Clause that would allow for administrative preemption under certain limited circumstances, that 
would seem to exclude nonbinding executive action); Strauss, The Perils of Theory, supra note 
69, at 1574 (“Whatever the drafters’ theoretical expectations may have been . . . the passage of 
time has overcome them.”). 
 243. Merrill, supra note 69, at 762; Strauss, The Perils of Theory, supra note 69, at 1597–99. 
 244. I also do not think that administrative regulations should qualify for preemptive effect, 
see Rubenstein, supra note 64, at 1190–91 (rejecting the view that Congress can delegate 
supremacy as a matter of Constitutional Law and challenging the notion that administrative 
supremacy is functionally necessary or desirable), but my focus here on nonbinding executive 
policies is more narrow. 
 245. Cf. Brian Galle & Mark Seidenfeld, Administrative Law’s Federalism: Preemption, 
Delegation, and Agencies at the Edge of Federal Power, 57 DUKE L.J. 1933, 2010–12 (2008) 
(arguing in favor of the preemptive effect of binding administrative rules that have traversed the 
notice-and-comment process and that are subject to careful judicial review); Merrill, supra note 
69, at 761–64 (favoring a functional interpretation of the Supremacy Clause that would allow for 
administrative preemption under certain limited circumstances, which would seem to exclude 
nonbinding executive action). 
 246. Cf. Merrill, supra note 69, at 763 (“Laws,” as the term is used in the Supremacy Clause, 
“must refer, at a minimum, to explicit or implicit rules that bind the future exercise[s] of 
government authority.” (emphasis added)). 
 247. See Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861, 864–65 (2000) (holding that the 
Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard promulgated by the Department of Transportation 
preempted state tort action); City of New York v. FCC, 486 U.S. 57, 65 (1988) (holding that the 
FCC’s technical standards preempted any state standards); Fidelity Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. 
de la Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 159 (1982) (“Thus, we conclude that the [Federal Home Loan Bank] 
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The Executive’s enforcement priorities, however, do not fit even this 
modified version of preemption.248 In fact, the Executive has ardently 
disclaimed that its enforcement policies have binding effect.249 The 
reason is plain: The administration does not wish to invite or entertain 
legal challenges when it departs from its general priorities in 
individual cases. 
Of course, the administration’s position that subfederal 
governments are legally bound, but that the federal government is not 
cuts sharply against the grain of a nation built on law. Indeed, the 
Supremacy Clause works to prevent this very asymmetry through the 
structural paradox I introduced earlier: executive enforcement 
policies cannot both be Laws and not be Laws at the same time.250 By 
constitutional design, this protects states by affording them an 
opportunity to shape or block any Laws through the legislative 
process before they may become preemptively binding. 
Emphatically, none of this is to deny the Executive authority to set 
enforcement policies. The Executive may enforce or underenforce 
 
Board’s due-on-sale regulation was meant to pre-empt conflicting state limitations . . . .”); see 
also Merrill, supra note 69, at 764 (“[I]f Congress has delegated authority to an agency to act 
with the force of law, and if the agency has exercised this delegated power by taking action 
intended to have the force of law, then the agency edict can serve as a source of preemption.”). 
But cf. Young, Executive Preemption, supra note 12, at 871–75 (challenging administrative 
preemption on constitutional grounds); Rubenstein, supra note 64, at 1129–31 (same, and 
offering a normative defense of a system without “delegated supremacy”). 
 248.  Arizona Dream Act Coalition v. Brewer, No. 2:12-cv-02546, 2013 WL 2128315, at *7 
(D. Az. May 16, 2013) (holding that DACA does not have the “force of law,” and thus cannot 
have preemptive effect). 
 249. See, e.g., Memorandum from John Morton, Dir., ICE, to All Field Office Dirs. et al., 
Exercising Prosecutorial Discretion Consistent with the Civil Immigration Enforcement 
Priorities of the Agency for the Apprehension, Detention, and Removal of Aliens (June 17, 
2011), available at http://www.ice.gov/doclib/secure-communities/pdf/prosecutorial-discretion-
memo.pdf. The June 2011 memorandum of ICE Director John Morton, for example, contains 
the following “Disclaimer”: 
As there is no right to the favorable exercise of discretion by the agency, nothing in 
this memorandum should be construed to prohibit the apprehension, detention, or 
removal of any alien unlawfully in the United States or to limit the legal authority of 
ICE or any of its personnel to enforce federal immigration law. Similarly, this 
memorandum, which may be modified, superseded, or rescinded at any time without 
notice, is not intended to, does not, and may not be relied upon to create any right or 
benefit, substantive or procedural, enforceable at law by any party in any 
administrative, civil, or criminal matter. 
Id.; see also DACA Memo, supra note 14 (making a similar disclaimer); Arizona Dream Act, 
2013 WL 2128315, at *7 (observing that the Department of Homeland Security’s disclaimer in 
the DACA Memo undermined the plaintiffs’ claim that the Memo could have preemptive 
effect). 
 250. See discussion supra note 36. 
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congressional laws to whatever degree tolerated by the “Take Care” 
Clause and the political process. In this limited sense, executive 
enforcement policies may be understood to be immigration law 
(lower case “l”). But, without having traversed the legislative (or even 
the administrative rulemaking) process, in no proper sense may these 
policies be understood to be “Laws” (capital “L”) “made in pursuance 
[of the Constitution].” 
Nor does the foregoing deny Congress’s authority to preempt the 
field of immigration enforcement. The critical question, however, is 
whether Congress has done so—and, relatedly, whether enough 
circumstantial evidence exists to support such a sweeping conclusion 
by the Judiciary.251 To be sure, Congress has delegated enforcement 
and discretionary authority to the Department of Homeland Security 
(DHS).252 But these conferrals say nothing about displacing the state 
police power.253 Indeed, Congress’s delegation of enforcement roles to 
both public and private non-federal actors belies the notion that 
Congress intends immigration enforcement to be exclusively 
federal.254 Moreover, simply because Congress underfunds 
 
 251. Cf. Gonzales v. City of Peoria, 722 F.2d 468, 474 (9th Cir. 1983) (stating that federal 
regulation of a particular field “should not be presumed to preempt state enforcement activity 
‘in the absence of persuasive reasons—either that the nature of the regulated subject matter 
permits no other conclusion, or that the Congress has unmistakably so ordained’” (quoting 
DeCanas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351, 356 (1976))); see also Margaret H. Lemos, State Enforcement of 
Federal Law, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 698, 748–52 (2011) (addressing the potential federalism values 
served by subfederal enforcement of federal law). 
 252. See generally 8 U.S.C.A. § 1357 (West 2013).  
 253. The Department of Justice (DOJ) has taken different positions on whether states have 
inherent authority over immigration enforcement. For a time, DOJ maintained that local police 
may arrest for criminal immigration violations but not civil immigration violations. See 
Memorandum Op. from Teresa Wynn Roseborough, Deputy Assistant Att’y Gen., Office of 
Legal Counsel, U.S. Dep’t of Justice for the U.S. Att’y, S. Dist. of Cal. (Feb. 5, 1996), available 
at http://www.usdoj.gov/olc/immstopo1a.htm. But in a 2002 memorandum from the Office of 
Legal Counsel, it found that local police officers have “inherent authority” to arrest for both 
civil and criminal immigration violations. See Memorandum from Jay S. Bybee, Assistant Att’y 
Gen., Office of Legal Counsel, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to the U.S. Att’y Gen., Regarding Non-
Preemption of the Authority of State and Local Law Enforcement Officials to Arrest Aliens for 
Immigration Violations 1−4, 13 (Apr. 3, 2002), available at http://www.aclu.org/FilesPDFs/ 
ACF27DA.pdf. For one critique of the 2002 opinion, which has not been superseded, see 
generally Michael J. Wishnie, State and Local Police Enforcement of Immigration Laws, 6 U. 
PA. J. CONST. L. 1084, 1095 (2004) (“The Attorney General’s conclusion makes little sense, and 
contradicts not only well-settled canons of statutory interpretation, but also the specific 
legislative history of these provisions.”). 
 254. See Cox & Posner, supra note 9, at 1287–88 (discussing the role of employers, families, 
and state agents in monitoring and enforcing immigration law); see also MICHAEL JOHN 
GARCIA & KATE M. MANUEL, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 41423, AUTHORITY OF STATE 
AND LOCAL POLICE TO ENFORCE FEDERAL IMMIGRATION LAW 3–9 (2012) (canvassing 
Congress’s statutory delegations of enforcement authority to state and local police). But cf. 
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enforcement of the immigration law255 does not mean that Congress 
intends federal enforcement to be exclusive of the states. The opposite 
inference might just as easily be drawn—i.e., that Congress hopes and 
expects subfederal governments to play a gap-filling role. Similarly, to 
the extent that Congress instructs the Executive to prioritize how 
federal appropriations are spent,256 this does not itself suggest—much 
less require—federal enforcement exclusivity. To be clear, Congress 
might intend exclusive federal enforcement. But, to safeguard 
federalism, care is needed before rushing to the conclusion that 
Congress so intends.257 And for now, at least, the Court does not seem 
to believe that Congress intended to preempt the field of immigration 
enforcement.258 
The Executive’s role in foreign affairs complicates the analysis but 
does not change the result. As noted above, the Executive has an 
undeniable yet somewhat ambiguous constitutional role in foreign 
affairs.259 The fundamental question, however, is not what power the 
Executive has to speak for the country. Rather, the question is which 
executive expressions of foreign policy can preempt state law.260 
 
DeCanas, 424 U.S. at 361–62 (explaining that a federal statute that recognized some role for 
states in employment relationships involving undocumented immigrants was evidence that 
Congress did not intend to occupy the field of immigration employment). 
 255. “Underfunded” in the sense that the appropriations come nowhere near what it would 
take to fully enforce the law. This is not to deny the incredible sums of money that have been 
appropriated for enforcement. See DORIS MEISSNER ET AL., IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT IN 
THE UNITED STATES: THE RISE OF A FORMIDABLE MACHINERY 2–3 (2013), available at 
www.migrationpolicy.org/pubs/enforcementpillars.pdf (providing funding statistics). That these 
funds fall woefully short, however, only highlights the enormity of what full-enforcement would 
entail. 
 256. See, e.g., Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-74, div. D, tit. II, 
125 Stat. 786 (directing DHS to “prioritize the identification and removal of aliens convicted of 
a crime by the severity of that crime”); accord Department of Homeland Security 
Appropriations Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-83, tit. II, 123 Stat. 2142. 
 257. Cf. Gonzales v. City of Peoria, 722 F.2d 468, 474 (9th Cir. 1983) (stating that federal 
regulation of a particular field “should not be presumed to preempt state enforcement activity 
“‘in the absence of persuasive reasons—either that the nature of the regulated subject matter 
permits no other conclusion, or that the Congress has unmistakably so ordained’” (quoting 
DeCanas, 424 U.S. at 356). 
 258. If the Court believed that Congress intended to oust subfederal enforcement through 
field preemption, there would have been no need for the Court to consider in Arizona whether 
state arrest measures undermined or conflicted with federal enforcement priorities. 
 259. See supra notes 82–83 and accompanying text (explaining executive control over 
immigration stems from its constitutionally enumerated power over foreign affairs). 
 260. Cf. Clark, Domesticating Sole Executive Agreements, supra note 69, at 1660 (“[A]s a 
practical matter, the President may make sole executive agreements . . . . The Constitution, 
however, does not require courts to recognize such agreements as ‘the supreme Law of the 
Land.”); Denning & Ramsey, supra note 12, at 829 (“It is, of course, uncontroversial that 
ordinarily state laws and policies must give way to the foreign affairs objectives of the national 
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The negative inference from the Supremacy Clause is that 
“Treaties” are the only foreign commitments that can preempt state 
law.261 And, as Professor Clark has highlighted, the context and 
drafting history of the Supremacy Clause strongly supports that 
interpretation.262 Still, the Court’s precedent has been more 
generous—at least when the President is involved. More specifically, 
the Court has held that formalized executive agreements with foreign 
nations can preempt state law under certain limited circumstances.263 
Of course, however, DHS enforcement policies—even if blessed by 
the President—are of a very different ilk. To begin with, DHS policies 
are not ordained with a stamp of national commitment to foreign 
countries. Moreover, whereas executive agreements necessarily 
implicate foreign affairs, immigration enforcement policies only 
sometimes will, leaving difficult evidentiary questions about what will 
prove a sufficient conflict with foreign policy and how deeply a court 
should probe to discover it. Thus, as Patrick Charles argues, “[a]bsent 
a treaty or international agreement stating express foreign policy 
objectives, executive policy preferences alone are insufficient to 
preempt state and local immigration laws.”264 
Quite apart from the foregoing, the mantra that the country speak 
with “one voice” in foreign affairs obscures that the federal political 
branches are already speaking with two voices: that of Congress and 
the Executive.265 Although an undifferentiated federal government 
 
government. . . . The critical question, though, is how these overriding federal goals are 
developed and identified.”). 
 261. See Denning & Ramsey, supra note 12, at 907 (“By setting forth specific allocations of 
preemptive power, the Constitution contains a strong negative implication that it does not 
contain additional allocations of preemptive power sub silentio.”); see also id. at 843 (“The 
inclusion of treaties . . . in the Supremacy Clause shows the extent to which the Constitution’s 
framers focused upon state interference in foreign affairs under the Articles [of 
Confederation].”). 
 262. See Clark, Separation of Powers, supra note 12, at 1337–39 (noting that the negative 
implication of the Supremacy Clause is that the Constitution, federal laws, and treaties are the 
exclusive grounds for displacing state law). 
 263. See, e.g., Am. Ins. Ass’n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 416 (2003) (“Generally, then, valid 
executive agreements are fit to preempt state law, just as treaties are . . . .”). 
 264. Patrick J. Charles, Recentering Foreign Affairs Preemption in Arizona v. United States: 
Federal Plenary Power, the Spheres of Government, and the Constitutionality of S.B. 1070, 60 
CLEV. ST. L. REV. 133, 157 (2012). 
 265. See Cleveland, Crosby and the ‘One-Voice’ Myth in U.S. Foreign Relations, supra note 
130, at 985 (noting that “[i]t is clear that the Framers guaranteed, as a matter of constitutional 
design, that the United States would not ‘speak with one voice’ in foreign relations,” given the 
Constitution’s division of the foreign affairs power among the three federal branches); accord 
Alex Glashausser, Difference and Deference in Treaty Interpretation, 50 VILL. L. REV. 25, 41 
(2005). 
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clearly trumps the states in foreign affairs, as between the federal 
political branches, Congress generally trumps the President (and 
certainly trumps DHS).266 Thus, subfederal laws that send a strong 
message of unwelcome to unlawfully present immigrants will at least 
be consistent with Congress’s foreign affairs position with respect to 
this class of aliens (provided, of course, that such subfederal laws do 
not otherwise violate protected civil liberties).267 As Professor Spiro 
suggests, “state measures against undocumented aliens would almost 
by definition seem not only consistent with ultimate federal control of 
immigration . . . but also in furtherance of its execution to the extent 
that such measures may encourage unlawful aliens to repatriate.”268 
Again, this is not to deny federal eminence over the states in foreign 
affairs. Rather, my point is only to distinguish the character of 
nonbinding enforcement policies from other, more formalized, federal 
instruments (such as statutes, administrative regulations, treaties, and 
certain executive agreements). 
Endorsing the preemptive effect of unilateral executive action 
would cripple the political and procedural safeguards of federalism 
because states would lose their best (and perhaps only) opportunity 
to block preemptive laws.269 Of course, Congress may be able to 
override unilateral executive policies ex post. This ordering, however, 
significantly transfers the political burden. Given the many 
“vetogates” in the legislative process, it takes considerably more votes 
to pass a law than to block one.270 The inertial resistance of the federal 
legislative process, however, was structurally intended to inure to the 
states, not the Executive.271 
 
 266. Charles, supra note 264, at 157 (“[I]t is Congress’s purposes and objectives that are the 
benchmark from which courts must adjudicate foreign affairs preemption.”); see also Cox & 
Rodriguez, supra note 85, at 475; Yoo & Delahunty, supra note 19, (manuscript at 57) 
(“Although immigration straddles domestic and foreign policy, Congress, not the President, has 
the controlling authority in that area.”). 
 267. Cf. Brief for Michigan, supra note 154, at 8 (“[A] State enforcing Congress’s intent too 
well cannot violate Congress’s intent.”). 
 268. Spiro, Demi-Sovereignties, supra note 174, at 148. 
 269. See Denning & Ramsey, supra note 12, at 925 (making the same claim in the context of 
foreign affairs preemption). 
 270. See generally Eskridge, supra note 228, at 1444–48. Each of the vetogates present an 
opportunity for opponents of the measure to kill (or maim) a bill. Id. For general discussions on 
vetogates, see also William N. Eskridge, Jr. & John Ferejohn, The Article I, Section 7 Game, 80 
GEO. L.J. 523, 528–33 (1992); McNollgast, Positive Canons: The Role of Legislative Bargains in 
Statutory Interpretation, 80 GEO. L.J. 705, 716–27 (1992). 
 271. Denning & Ramsey, supra note 12, at 905 (arguing that permitting executive 
preemption in foreign affairs shifts “the burden of overcoming legislative inertia . . . from the 
President to the claimants”). For a general discussion on the erosion of the enumerated powers 
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*  *  * 
In sum, those that press for exceptionalism in immigration 
federalism explicitly or tacitly treat potential breakdowns along the 
separation of powers dimension as a basis for further concessions 
along the federalism dimension. They tend to highlight Congress’s 
plenary power over immigration, vast conferrals of policymaking 
power to the Executive, and inherent executive power to make 
immigration “Law.”272 The theory of immigration structuralism that I 
advance here takes a fundamentally different tack. Among other 
things, it treats possible failings along the separation of powers 
dimension as a reason for insisting upon preemption doctrine’s 
conventional application. That means rejecting a presumption in favor 
of preemption and foreclosing the preemptive effect of nonbinding 
executive enforcement policies. These limitations safeguard 
federalism by channeling preemption decisions to Congress, and, 
concomitantly, away from the Executive and courts. 
B. Safeguarding Separation of Powers 
Apart from safeguarding federalism, the normalization of 
immigration preemption doctrine may also indirectly safeguard 
separation of powers in four critical respects. First, limiting the class of 
preemptive federal laws to those expressly contemplated in the 
Supremacy Clause puts pressure on the federal political branches to 
adhere to constitutionally prescribed lawmaking procedures—at least 
when the political branches intend such policies to have preemptive 
effect.273 In a system where executive policies can trump state law, 
Congress has far more political incentive to delegate than to decide; 
meanwhile, the Executive has far more political incentive to decide 
 
doctrine and its implications for preemption doctrine, see, for example, Young, The Ordinary 
Diet, supra note 173, at 306 (“[T]he enumerated limits on Congress’s powers now play an 
extremely limited role in preserving the federal balance, and preemption has become the central 
question of our federalism.”). 
 272. See, e.g., Fan, supra note 134, at 1273, 1275, 1296–98 (arguing that the “plenary power 
doctrine, though oft critiqued as protection stripping and a basis for judicial nonintervention, 
can inform in our contemporary context judicial intervention against overreaching state laws” 
and “protect[] against the new strategy of dissentient state laws encroaching on executive 
enforcement policy”). 
 273. See Denning & Ramsey, supra note 12, at 829 (“Giving mere Executive policy 
preemptive effect . . . bypasses these constitutional processes and concentrates power in the 
executive branch.”); see also id. (“[R]ejecting executive preemption enhances checks and 
balances in foreign affairs; accepting it reduces them.”). 
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for itself than to seek congressional approval.274 Either way, 
immigration power is accumulated in the Executive. That is certainly 
problematic if Congress did not intend it.275 If, on the other hand, 
Congress intends wink-and-nod lawmaking through de facto 
delegation, then judicial foreclosure of executive preemption could 
help curb that pathology. 
Second, applying the Supremacy Clause in a way that 
discriminates between legislative and executive action preserves 
certain subfederal policies that could otherwise be preempted.276 The 
resulting regulatory overlap can generate political discourse that 
sheds light on the federal policy, can spur Congress to take a harder 
look at the issues, and can even provide Congress political grist to 
decide those issues.277 Indeed, if nothing else, the subfederal 
restrictionist movement has successfully galvanized a national debate 
on the desirability of greater or lesser immigration enforcement.278 
Third, the friction generated by federal-state overlap sheds light 
on which federal institution has ownership of the policies at issue.279 
This becomes particularly salient in contexts like those at issue here, 
where the law on the books may not reflect its operational expression. 
In a system where executive enforcement policies can trump state law, 
it would not matter whether executive policies are consistent with or 
antithetical to congressional design. Removing the outlet of executive 
preemption, however, puts political pressure on the Executive to 
achieve its desired ends through the legislative process. Short of that, 
the Executive would have to come clean in its inability or 
 
 274. Cf. id. at 902 (“[T]o the extent executive preemption is accepted as a constitutional 
power, it broadens the President’s ability to conduct foreign affairs without a congressional 
check.”). 
 275. In similar regard, John Yoo and Robert Delahunty note that “the threat of non-
enforcement gives the President improper leverage over Congress by providing a second, post-
enactment veto.” Yoo & Delahunty, supra note 19, (manuscript at 9). 
 276. For example, absent the administration’s enforcement priorities, it is possible that 
Arizona’s S.B. 1070 Section 3 (involving registration violations) and Section 6 (involving 
warrantless arrests) would not have been preempted. See supra notes 154–59 and accompanying 
text. In any event, the absence of executive preemption could only lead to equal or more 
federal-state regulatory overlap. 
 277. Cf. Gerken & Bulman-Pozen, supra note 80, at 1305 (“A more limited preemption 
doctrine . . . would require Congress to engage more directly with state policies it wished to 
override.”); Hills, Against Preemption, supra note 227, at 9–10 (2007) (“State lawmaking can 
give Congress the right incentives to focus on the most important ambiguities in federal law.”). 
 278. See Heather K. Gerken, Federalism All the Way Down, 124 HARV. L. REV. 4, 68 (2010) 
(making the point that S.B. 1070 forced national elites to engage the issue of immigration). 
 279. Cf. Gerken & Bulman-Pozen, supra note 80, at 1289 (noting that accountability is a 
benefit that is derived from the overlap of federal-state regulation). 
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unwillingness to obtain congressional support. Insofar as subfederal 
governments are relying on Congress’s law, the Executive must 
effectively shrug off Congress when it shrugs off subfederal 
resistance.280 A doctrine that forecloses the preemptive effect of 
nonbinding executive policies exposes the gulf between what the law 
says and does, and thus may spur Congress or the courts into action.281 
Fourth, as earlier explained, the line between permissible law 
execution and impermissible lawmaking is obscured, in part, by the 
question of whether the Executive’s policy owes to resource 
constraints or political preference. Foreclosing executive preemption 
may help to bring more transparency to the Executive’s actions. If 
executive underenforcement is born of resource constraints (and thus 
justified against separation of powers challenges), it becomes more 
difficult for the administration to credibly argue that subfederal 
enforcement initiatives preemptively conflict with federal law: The 
multiplier of subfederal enforcement generally should not pose an 
obstacle (and thus should not be preempted).282 Meanwhile, if the 
administration insists that subfederal initiatives conflict with 
executive priorities (thus raising the specter of a preemptive conflict), 
courts may begin to appreciate those executive priorities as a type of 
affirmative policy encroaching on the legislative function (thus 
exposing a potential separation of powers problem). 
These points come to life in the legal and political discourse 
surrounding the Executive’s DACA program. As discussed earlier, 
DACA permits certain qualifying undocumented immigrants to 
remain and work in the United States for renewable two-year 
periods.283 Arizona and other states have adopted policies of denying 
drivers licenses to DACA beneficiaries.284 The American Civil 
 
 280. Cf. Bulman-Pozen, supra note 12, at 483, 486, 489 (making a similar point for 
cooperative federalism schemes). 
 281. Cf. id. 
 282. Of course, if subfederal enforcement initiatives burden executive resources in ways not 
intended by Congress, then a preemptive conflict might exist. The party claiming preemption, 
however, should bear the burden of demonstrating that. For the interesting view that subfederal 
enforcement measures may be unconstitutional as a type of “reverse-commandeering,” see 
generally Margaret Hu, Reverse-Commandeering, 46 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 535 (2012). But even 
assuming that the Constitution protects the federal government against commandeering, cf. 
Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 933 (1997) (holding that states are protected against 
federal commandeering), substantiating such a claim would still require showing that subfederal 
measures have commandeering effect. 
 283. See supra notes 14–15 and accompanying text (allowing for discretion in prosecuting 
illegal immigrants that came to the United States as children). 
 284. See supra note 27. 
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Liberties Union and others have recently filed suits to enjoin this 
subfederal resistance, raising the questions of whether DACA could 
or should have preemptive effect.285 For reasons earlier explained, I do 
not think DACA can preempt. Nor do I think it should. 
It will be useful here to compare and contrast how a “yes” or “no” 
answer to the preemption question might change the political 
dynamics. To begin with, a “yes” answer significantly alleviates the 
Executive’s incentive to obtain congressional support for the DACA 
program. Indeed, past efforts to obtain congressional support have 
repeatedly failed,286 leaving us to wonder whether members of 
Congress intended, or simply hoped, to pass the buck. This shines light 
on a related concern with a “yes” answer: Congress has less incentive 
to enact such legislation if it knows or expects the Executive to 
accomplish similar ends. This is not the way federal Law is supposed 
to be made.287 Nor is it the best way. Indeed, as generous as the DACA 
program is, immigrant advocates have expressed a strong preference 
for a legislative solution on account of the assurance and stability it 
would bring relative to the administration’s nonbinding program.288 
By contrast, a “no” answer to whether DACA can preempt leaves 
room for subfederal governments to dissent—such as by denying 
drivers licenses to DACA beneficiaries. This still permits the 
Executive to promote the DACA policy, but only as a national 
default, subject to jurisdictional resistance. The existence of 
competing policies shines greater political light on the fact that 
DACA is an executive (rather than congressional) policy, because as a 
statutory program it would clearly have preemptive effect. Once 
attributed to the Executive, questions naturally arise over whether the 
 
 285. See supra note 28. Recently, the United States District Court of Arizona held that 
Arizona’s policy of denying drivers licenses to DACA beneficiaries was not preempted, 
dismissing the plaintiffs’ claim. Arizona Dream Act Coalition v. Brewer, No. 2:12-cv-02546, 2013 
WL 2128315 (D. Az. May 16, 2013). 
 286. See Amended Complaint, Crane v. Napolitano, supra note 16, at 18–19 (collecting cites 
for two dozen bills in which the DREAM Act, in various forms, has been proposed). 
 287. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7 (declaring that Law shall be made through bicameral 
congressional legislation and presented to the President). 
 288. See, e.g., Gilbert, Obama’s Ruby Slippers, supra note 19; Jens Erik Gould, Why Are 
Some Undocumenteds Nervous About Obama’s Immigration Reform?, TIME (Aug. 13, 2012), 
http://nation.time.com/2012/08/13/why-are-some-undocumenteds-nervous-about-obamas-immig 
ration-reform/#ixzz2CJ0Sg8lf; Tamar Jacoby, Obama’s Executive Order Is Good News, But Not 
the Solution, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT DEBATE CLUB (June 19, 2012), 
http://www.usnews.com/debate-club/is-obama-right-to-grant-young-illegal-immigrants-work-pe 
rmits/obamas-executive-order-is-political-theater; Michael Olivas, Why “Deferred Action” Isn’t 
Enough, FROM THE SQUARE (Oct. 25, 2012), http://www.fromthesquare.org/?p=3829. 
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initiative is born of resource constraint, preferential policy, or both. 
This, in turn, can force transparency, which conceivably could aid a 
court in determining whether the Executive is “tak[ing] Care that the 
Laws be faithfully executed.”289 Even short of a judicial check, 
however, pressuring the Executive to explain whether the program is 
born of resource constraints or political preference helps point to 
where political accountability rests.290 
*  *  * 
The foregoing Part advanced a theory of immigration 
structuralism. Its underlying premise is that we should consult both 
federalism and separation of powers norms in addressing questions of 
relative power in the current immigration debate. The 
interdimensional relationship between separation of powers and 
federalism generates possibilities for harnessing that relationship in 
structurally and politically reinforcing ways. The normalization of 
immigration preemption doctrine seeks to do just that, offering 
safeguards for both federalism and separation of powers. 
IV. FORM AND SUBSTANCE 
This concluding Part responds to perhaps the most trenchant 
objection to my proposal: that it improvidently values form over 
substance. To curb expectations, those of the view that structural 
norms are irrelevant or wholly expendable may safely stop reading. 
Nothing I offer below is intended or likely to convince otherwise. 
Surely, my own view is that structure matters—not only because of 
the liberty-enhancing values it promotes, but also, more 
fundamentally, because our Constitution demands it.291 Though 
federalism may not yield optimal outcomes in all cases, it remains 
central to our governmental order.292 To insist on these points at any 
 
 289. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3. 
 290. President Obama publically took the position that the policy is due to resource 
constraints. See Barack Obama, Exclusive: A Nation of Laws and a Nation of Immigrants, TIME 
(June 17, 2012),  http://ideas.time.com/2012/06/17/a-nation-of-laws-and-a-nation-of-immigrants/. 
 291. See, e.g., Young, Making Federalism, supra note 135, at 1762−64 (“Even if one were 
convinced that all the functional arguments for federalism . . . were spurious, it would not be 
open to us to reject federalism and create a unitary system.”). But see generally Edwin Rubin & 
Malcolm Feeley, Federalism: Some Notes on a National Neurosis, 41 UCLA L. REV. 903, 903−52 
(1994) (offering a classic view to the contrary, and arguing that the current dominant 
interpretation of federalism is grounded in improper functional valuations). 
 292. See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 157 (1992) (“Our task would be the same 
even if one could prove that federalism secured no advantages to anyone. It consists not of 
devising our preferred system of government, but of understanding and applying the framework 
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greater length here, however, is beyond the scope of this Article’s 
ambition. Rather, my only hope for this Part is to explain why 
elevating substance over form—while principled—may be a 
dangerous long-term strategy for the very advocates of that ordering. 
A. Valuing Immigration Federalism 
The exclusivity principle would be more attractive if there were 
simply no value in leaving subfederal space to operate. But there is 
potential value, even if we think that many of the subfederal measures 
on the table are politically misguided or morally reproachable. 
First, immigration federalism offers a means toward satisfying 
more citizen preferences than federal exclusivity necessarily would. 
Professor Rodriguez explains, for example, that because “the effects 
of immigration are felt differently in different parts of the country,” 
subfederal “participation in integration matters can promote 
efficiency” and optimize localized political preferences.293 In this 
regard, Professor Rodriguez highlights the “primary function states 
and localities play” in integrating both legal and illegal immigrants 
into the body politic.294 This integrative function is born of territorial 
necessity; but, as such, it is also a function over which subfederal 
governments have developed experience and expertise.295 Preferences 
can thus be locally tailored and attuned in ways that centralized 
decisionmaking generally cannot.296 
Recent history evidences both a need and a desire for this 
flexibility. Though some subfederal governments enact restrictionist 
measures, others enact protectionist measures that federal law does 
not require (and in some cases may not even allow). For example, 
some subfederal governments provide welfare benefits that federal 
 
set forth in the Constitution.”); see also Ashutosh Bhagwat, Wyeth v. Levine and Agency 
Preemption: More Muddle, or Creeping to Clarity?, 45 TULSA L. REV. 197, 225 (2009) (“The 
Constitution preserves state authority even when it is inefficient . . . .”). 
 293. Rodriguez, The Significance of the Local, supra note 41, at 608−09; see also Huntington, 
supra note 139, at 831 (“Decentralizing and devolving decisionmaking regarding non-citizens 
may accommodate, and reflect a great variety of views on, non-citizens . . . .”); Rick Su, A 
Localist Reading of Local Immigration Regulations, 86 N. CAR. L. REV. 1619, 1632−54 (2008) 
(highlighting the important potential for localism in immigration regulation). 
 294. Rodriguez, The Significance of the Local, supra note 41, at 571 (demonstrating how 
states integrate immigrants in order to establish the proposition that immigration regulation 
should be included in the list of quintessentially state interests). 
 295. Id. at 582. 
 296. See id. at 582−90 (providing examples of how different states create different solutions 
to best solve localized immigration issues). 
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law does not require, allow day-labor centers for unauthorized 
workers, offer in-state tuition to unauthorized immigrants, grant them 
drivers licenses, and resist cooperating with federal immigration 
enforcement.297 Federal exclusivity would eliminate these localized 
preferences. Indeed, as Professors Young and Baker note, subfederal 
laws that violate no federal or state constitution but that “nonetheless 
express a moral preference that some find reprehensible” tend to 
denote areas of moral disagreement and thus are “precisely the areas 
in which interstate diversity is most valuable.”298 
Second, preserving a subfederal role promotes regulatory 
experimentation.299 For example, as Professor Huntington explains, 
some restrictionist localities might invest in new means and resources 
for identifying unlawful immigrants.300 The national and other 
subfederal governments might be informed about the utility of others’ 
experiments, without having to make investments themselves.301 If 
subfederal enforcement results in other problems, “such as racial 
profiling, decreased reporting of crimes by non-citizens, and fewer 
arrests for other crimes, the national government might reconsider its 
enlistment of state and local officers and decide to preempt the 
conduct.”302 At the same time, subfederal protectionist initiatives that 
might otherwise be preempted by a centralized and uniform law also 
afford experimental opportunities.303 
 
 
 
 297. Id. (discussing subfederal integrative schemes). For a discussion of the permissibility of 
subfederal “sanctuary” programs, see generally Pratheepan Gulasekaram & Rose Cuison 
Villazor, Sanctuary Policies & Immigration Federalism: A Dialectic Analysis, 55 WAYNE L. REV. 
1683 (2009). 
 298. Baker & Young, supra note 47, at 155−56. 
 299. See Huntington, supra note 139, at 847 (discussing the experimental value of restrictive 
subnational laws); Matthew Parlow, A Localist’s Case for Decentralizing Immigration Policy, 84 
DENV. U. L. REV. 1061, 1070−71 (2007) (explaining that “local government experimentation in 
the immigration realm can lead to successes or failures that can inform federal policy-making”). 
But cf. Cunningham-Parmeter, supra note 137, at 1673−77 (challenging the assertion that states 
can serve as valuable laboratories of immigration reform). 
 300. Huntington, supra note 139, at 843. 
 301. Id. 
 302. Id. 
 303. See Rodriguez, The Significance of the Local, supra note 41, at 580 (noting that 
subfederal protectionist measures are “vulnerable in the face of a strong theory of 
preemption”); see also Howard Chang, Public Benefits and Federal Authorization for Alienage 
Discrimination by the States, 58 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 357, 363−64 (2002) (observing that 
“we might just as plausibly view federal authorization of divergent state policies as creating 
laboratories of generosity toward immigrants”). 
RUBENSTEIN 10.20.2013 (DO NOT DELETE) 10/21/2013  10:40 PM 
142 DUKE JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW & PUBLIC POLICY [VOL. 8:1 
Third—and perhaps most importantly—our federalist system was 
intended to preserve a role for the states as a check against federal 
policies.304 As noted earlier, subfederal governments have important 
economic and social stakes in unlawful immigration. To the extent 
that the national policy does not address these concerns, leaving a role 
for subfederal governments is critical.305 Through dissenting action, 
subfederal governments can summon the federal government to 
respond in ways that verbal criticism alone cannot.306 In this regard, 
Jessica Bulman-Pozen and Heather Gerken explain: “[I]t is desirable 
to have some level of friction, some amount of state contestation, 
some deliberation-generating froth in our democratic system.”307 In 
like regard, Robert Schapiro explains that “[a] state law can provide 
an important protest—a powerful criticism of the federal approach” 
that may in time help to produce a change in federal policy.308 
This holds equally true for both restrictionist and protectionist 
subfederal measures. As relates to federal underenforcement in 
particular, states can provide a check on executive policy—and 
simultaneously protect their own interests—through increased 
enforcement efforts.309 Even if such checks do not occasion change at 
the federal level, at least states will not be powerless to protect 
themselves against the unevenly distributed costs of unlawful 
immigration. As Margaret Lemos observes (speaking outside the 
immigration context but in terms fully apt here), a subfederal 
 
 304. See infra text accompanying notes 320−32 (describing how immigration federalism can 
act as a check against federal overreach); see also Huntington, supra note 139, at 836−37 
(“Sharing immigration authority means that states and localities also will be able to counteract 
federal immigration regulation.”). 
 305. See Huntington, supra note 139, at 833 (arguing that national immigration policy fails to 
adequately address state-specific economic and social concerns). 
 306. Bulman-Pozen & Gerken, supra note 80, at 1284−85 (noting surprising neglect in 
federalism literature of how states implementing federal mandates can be a dissenter, rival, and 
challenger); Heather K. Gerken, Dissenting by Deciding, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1745, 1749, 1783 
(2005) (noting that “federalism can be understood at least in part as a strategy for allowing 
would-be dissenters to govern in some subpart of a system,” which in turn contributes to the 
marketplace of ideas, and facilitates self-government and self-expression). 
 307. Bulman-Pozen & Gerken, supra note 80, at 1284. 
 308. Robert A. Schapiro, Toward a Theory of Interactive Federalism, 91 IOWA L. REV. 243, 
289 (2005). 
 309. See Lemos, supra note 251, at 748 (“Enforcement authority creates a state-level check 
against underenforcement by federal agencies.”); Amy Widman, Advancing Federalism 
Concerns in Administrative Law Through a Revitalization of State Enforcement Powers: A Case 
Study of the Consumer Product Safety and Improvement Act of 2008, 29 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 
165, 176−77 (2010) (explaining that enforcement authority enables states to step in when federal 
agencies fail to enforce). 
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enforcement role “offers a hedge against the possibility that the 
federal government will occupy the field . . . and then abdicate on 
enforcement.”310 Indeed, federal abdication is precisely what many 
subfederal jurisdictions are complaining about. At the same time, 
preserving subfederal autonomy offers a vital check against what may 
be ill-advised federal enforcement policies. The recent surge of 
subfederal resistance to President Obama’s Secure Communities 
program is a testament to this.311 Under the Secure Communities 
program, DHS receives fingerprint data for persons arrested by local 
law enforcement.312 If the arrestee is found to be unlawfully present, 
DHS issues a “detainer” requesting that local enforcement hold the 
arrestee for up to forty-eight hours while DHS arranges to transfer 
the individual into federal custody.313 Though many subfederal 
jurisdictions have embraced Secure Communities, a growing number 
have expressed disapproval, with some actively (and openly) refusing 
to comply.314 These complaining jurisdictions have argued that the 
federal program may upset civil rights and undermine community 
building efforts of local law enforcement.315 Rendering subfederal 
governments impotent would sideline local preferences and vitiate a 
dialogue-generating counterbalance to federal enforcement policy. 
Providing space for dissenting action—whether protectionist or 
 
 310. Lemos, supra note 251, at 764; see also Schapiro, Toward a Theory of Interactive 
Federalism, supra note 308, at 290 (noting that “redundancy constitutes a fail-safe mechanism—
an additional source of protection if one or the other government should fail to offer adequate 
safeguards” arising from a failure either to address an issue or to enforce applicable 
regulations). 
 311.  The list of non-complying jurisdictions includes, but is not limited to, Connecticut, see 
Mary E. O’Leary, Connecticut First State to Set Rules for Holding Undocumented Immigrants for 
ICE, NEW HAVEN REGISTER (Mar. 27, 2012), http://nhregister.com/articles/ 
2012/03/27/news/doc4f727619070ce218682048.txt; Milwaukee, see Milwaukee, Wis., County Bd. 
Res. 12-135 (June 4, 2012); the District of Columbia, see D.C. Council, The Immigration 
Detainer Compliance Amendment Act of 2011 (June 5, 2012); Santa Clara, see Santa Clara, 
Calif., Board of Supervisors’ Policy Manual Sec. 3.54, Civil Immigration Retainer Requests 
(Oct. 18, 2011); San Francisco, see San Francisco, Calif., Board of Supervisors Resolution 535-
11, Supporting Policy Restricting Use of Local Funds to Respond to Civil Immigration 
Detainers (Dec. 23, 2011); and Cook County (Chicago), see Cook County, Ill., County 
Commission Ordinance 11-0-73, Fair and Equal County for Immigrants Ordinance (Sept. 7, 
2011); see also Lornet Turnbull, 3 King County Officials Balk at ICE Detainer Program, 
SEATTLE TIMES, May 9, 2012; Mihir Zaveri, In D.C., No Warm Welcome for Immigration 
Crackdown, WASH. POST, June 6, 2012. 
 312. TASK FORCE ON SECURE CMTYS., HOMELAND SEC. ADVISORY COUNCIL, U.S. DEP’T 
OF HOMELAND SEC. 4 (2011). 
 313.  Id. at 26−27. 
 314. See supra note 311 (collecting examples). 
 315. See Turnbull, supra note 311; Zaveri, supra note 311. 
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restrictionist—can thus be a virtue. 
None of this is to insist that the values of decentralization will be 
met with every subfederal law. Sometimes the costs of 
decentralization will be outweighed by the values of centralization. 
For example, uniformity may counteract race-to-the-bottom and 
externality pathologies that decentralization may produce.316 Beyond 
these concerns, decentralization may upset the foreign affairs 
principle that we speak as a nation with “one voice” on matters 
involving immigration.317 Finally, there is concern that violations of 
individual rights are more likely to occur when subfederal 
governments play a role in enforcement.318 
These are real concerns, indeed. But Congress—not the courts, 
and not the Executive—should be making decisions about when the 
values of centralization outweigh the potential values of 
decentralization. Congress is the institutional body best positioned to 
make those decisions, and the Supremacy Clause also seems to 
require it.319 To the extent that there is something special about 
immigration, Congress can and should take action to give it special 
treatment. Our concern should be aroused, however, when the courts 
elevate either their own or the Executive’s will over that of Congress. 
 
 316. See, e.g., Cunningham-Parmeter, supra note 137, at 1725 (discussing these pathologies 
as related to subfederal restrictionist laws); see also Baker & Young, supra note 47, at 125−26 
(noting that the “need to overcome externalities and other collective action problems . . . is one 
of the classic justifications for federal action”). Of course, whether subfederal initiatives to 
enforce the immigration laws signify a race to the bottom (or top) probably depends on one’s 
perspective. 
 317. See Lauren Gilbert, Immigrant Laws, Obstacle Preemption and the Lost Legacy of 
McCulloch, BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 153, 191, 204 (2012); Michael Olivas, Immigration-
Related State and Local Ordinances: Preemption, Prejudice, and the Proper Role for 
Enforcement, 2007 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 27, 35, 53; Pham, supra note 95, at 991, 1001; Spiro, Demi-
Sovereignties, supra note 174, at 156 (summarizing foreign affairs arguments for unitary federal 
control); see also United States v. Arizona, 641 F.3d 339, 352−53 (9th Cir. 2011) (enjoining 
preliminarily portions of S.B. 1070 on the ground that it would “have a deleterious effect on the 
United States’ foreign relations” to the point that it creates “actual foreign policy problems of a 
magnitude far greater than incidental”); id. at 366−39 (Noonan, J., concurring) (focusing on 
foreign affairs reasons to preliminarily enjoin sections of S.B. 1070). 
 318. See, e.g., Pham, supra note 95, at 997 (“The possibility of rogue enforcement of 
immigration laws, where officers employ racial profiling and other prohibited practices, is much 
more likely to occur at the local levels, compounding the uniformity problem.”); see also Orde 
Kittrie, Federalism, Deportation and Crime Victims Afraid to Call the Police, 91 IOWA L. REV. 
1449, 1477 (2006) (explaining why police may be hesitant to be involved in immigration law 
enforcement); Michael J. Wishnie, Introduction: Immigration and Federalism, 58 NYU ANN. 
SURVEY AM. L. 283, 291 (2002) (describing various tensions that may arise between local law 
enforcement and federal immigration agencies). 
 319. See supra Part III (explaining why Congress both should and must have the final say on 
matters of immigration Law). 
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B. The Dangers of Selective Exceptionalism 
Still, given the immediacy of the problem at hand, most immigrant 
advocates may understandably prefer to take their chances with a 
doctrine that promotes across-the-board federal uniformity, even (or 
especially) in the face of congressional silence or ambiguity. The 
exigencies of the subfederal immigration revolution, they may argue, 
can neither await nor be made to depend upon a legislative response. 
To be sure, this view of immigration federalism is entirely principled: 
it understands the restrictionist measures as wrongheaded—either 
because they are ineffectual or harmful—and seeks to liberalize 
structural norms to accommodate desired ends. But that approach 
leaves much cause for concern. 
First, claims for an expansive preemption doctrine in immigration 
rely heavily on the same foreign affairs rationale excoriated by 
generations of immigrant advocates in their assault on the plenary 
doctrine.320 Though that assault is mostly directed at promoting limits 
on federal action through the Bill of Rights,321 the very same concerns 
resonate for structuralism—inasmuch as it too is directed at securing 
liberty.322 Even in the subconstitutional context of administrative law, 
the nexus between immigration and foreign affairs has been 
scrupulously parsed to prevent immigration agencies from too easily 
taking advantage of the notice-and-comment rulemaking exception 
for foreign affairs.323 To selectively rely on foreign affairs as a reason 
 
 320. See supra notes 86−97 and accompanying text (explaining the plenary doctrine and 
noting that the foreign affairs rationale has historically been used to uphold federal action 
against immigrant interests). See also Legomsky, Immigration Law, supra note 81, at 155, 
261−65 (questioning the foreign affairs rationale for the plenary doctrine, and noting that 
“commentators . . . are in broad agreement that not all matters affecting foreign policy are 
beyond judicial cognizance”); Neuman, The Lost Century, supra note 183, at 1898 (“[T]he 
correlation between the substance of immigration policy and the [foreign relations] factors that 
have been invoked to justify extreme judicial deference is very weak.”). But cf. Legomsky, 
Immigration Law, supra note 81, at 266−67 (suggesting that the foreign affairs rationale might 
have a different application in federalism, as opposed to the separation of powers context). 
 321. See, e.g., Chin, Segregation’s Last Stronghold, supra note 84, at passim (arguing that the 
plenary doctrine allows racial discrimination in federal immigration laws). 
 322. See supra notes 57−60 and accompanying text (explaining how vertical separation of 
powers was intended to provide a check against the federal government). 
 323. See Zhang v. Slattery, 55 F.3d 732, 737 (2d Cir. 1995) (holding that Administrative 
Procedure Act’s foreign affairs exception for notice-and-comment rulemaking did not apply due 
to an insufficient link between the agency’s policy and foreign affairs); Jean v. Nelson, 711 F.2d 
1455, 1477–78 (11th Cir. 1983) (construing the foreign affairs exception very narrowly); see also 
City of New York v. Permanent Mission of India to United Nations, 618 F.3d 172, 202 (2d Cir. 
2010) (noting that “it would be problematic if incidental foreign affairs effects eliminated public 
participation in this entire area of administrative law”). 
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for federal exclusivity or for a special Executive role in preemption 
undermines important progress made by immigration advocates in 
other contexts. 
Second, Professor Spiro’s “steam-valve” theory offers yet another 
cautionary note. Using historical immigration examples, he explains 
how allowing space for subfederal governments to act on anti-
immigrant sentiments can diminish “interest on their part to seek 
national legislation to similarly restrictionist ends.”324 By providing 
room for subfederal governments to “let off their steam, however 
scalding it may be, the nation need not visit the same sins.”325 At the 
same time, subfederal variance “could also work to distribute the 
costs of undocumented aliens more equitably among the states” and 
“encourage migration to where their presence is more desired.”326 
Professor Spiro’s steam-valve theory takes on added significance 
when considered in connection with the plenary doctrine. As 
preemption doctrine expands to suppress subfederal interests, states 
can be expected to push harder for a national solution that suits their 
restrictionist agenda. And, if successful, those restrictionist policies 
“will move from a context in which judicial discipline is extremely 
stern to one in which it is most relaxed.”327 Without knowing what 
Congress will decide if and when it tackles the issues, or what a future 
administration might bring, it seems short-sighted for immigrant 
advocates to invest in structural doctrines that instill an 
undifferentiated federal monopoly. As Professor Huntington notes, 
“there is no structural reason to believe that one level of government 
will be more or less welcoming to non-citizens and therefore, on this 
basis, to favor uniformity over experimentalism.”328 
 
 324. Spiro, Learning to Live, supra note 92, at 1627. These examples included congressional 
restrictionist enactments in 1996, following the judicial defeat of California’s Proposition 187. 
 325. Spiro, Demi-Sovereignties, supra note 174, at 174. For critiques of Professor Spiro’s 
steam-valve theory, see, for example, Gulasekaram & Ramakrishnan, A Reappraisal, supra note 
170 (rejecting the premise of the steam-valve theory); Gerald L. Neuman, Aliens as Outlaws: 
Government Services, Proposition 187, and the Structure of Equal Protection Doctrine, 42 UCLA 
L. REV. 1425, 1436–37 (1995); Wishnie, Laboratories of Bigotry, supra note 174, at 558 
(“History simply does not support reliance on ‘steam valve federalism’ as a reason to celebrate 
the claimed new state freedom to discriminate against immigrants.”). 
 326. Spiro, Demi-Sovereignties, supra note 174, at 173. 
 327. Spiro, Learning to Live, supra note 92, at 1632. 
 328. Huntington, supra note 139, at 831 (“In a world where some states are offering in-state 
tuition to unauthorized migrants while the federal government is seeking to construct a wall 
along the southern border, it is by no means clear that the national government will better 
protect the interests of non-citizens.”). 
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Third, as several commentators have expressed, a principal 
concern with the restrictionist movement is that it is racially 
motivated.329 To the extent that concern is well founded, the equal-
protection doctrine (not the preemption doctrine) would seem to be 
the more appropriate fix.330 Whereas the federal government’s 
alienage classifications are mostly immune from judicial review under 
the plenary doctrine, the Court has declared subfederal 
“classifications based on alienage” to be “inherently suspect to close 
judicial scrutiny,” at least when the discrimination targets lawfully 
present immigrants.331 As to lawfully present immigrants, then, the 
Court can be expected to thwart unlawful discrimination without 
having to distort preemption doctrine for that purpose.332 
 
 329. See, e.g., Lucas Guttentag, Discrimination, Preemption, and Arizona’s Immigration 
Law: A Broader View, 65 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 1 (June 18, 2012), 
http://www.stanfordlawreview.org/online/discrimination-preemption (noting that the current 
immigration debate is driven by discrimination); Kevin R. Johnson, Immigration and Civil 
Rights: State and Local Efforts to Regulate Immigration, 46 GA. L. REV. 609, 636 (2012) 
(“Modern immigration clearly implicated issues of race.”); Johnson, Minorities, Immigrant and 
Otherwise, supra note 84, at 79 (arguing that immigrants are punished by voters as a 
consequence of their race); Motomura, The Rights of Others, supra note 6, at 1743 (“[T]he most 
forceful and often repeated criticism of state and local involvement in immigration enforcement 
is improper reliance on race and ethnicity. . . . [T]he concern is that not only unauthorized 
migrants, but also lawfully present U.S. citizens and noncitizens, will suffer targeting and 
discrimination by race and ethnicity.” (internal citation omitted)); see also Karla Mari 
McKanders, Sustaining Tiered Personhood: Jim Crow and Anti-Immigrant Laws, 26 HARV. J. 
ON RACIAL & ETHNIC JUST. 163, 163 (2010) (“[S]tate and local anti-immigrant laws lead to 
segregation, exclusion, and degradation of Latinos from American society in the same way that 
Jim Crow laws excluded African Americans from membership in social, political, and economic 
institutions within the United States and relegated them to second-class citizenship.”). 
 330. Indeed, several lawsuits challenge subfederal restrictionist policies on equal protection 
grounds. See, e.g., Hispanic Interest Coal. v. Bentley, 691 F.3d 1236 (11th Cir. 2012); Ga. Latino 
Alliance for Human Rights v. Deal, 793 F. Supp. 2d 1317, 1321 (N.D. Ga. 2011); Complaint, 
League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Arizona, No. 10-1453 (D. Ariz. July 9, 2010); 
Complaint, Valle del Sol v. Whiting, No. CV 10-1061 (D. Ariz. May 17, 2010). And, the 
Department of Justice, for its part, has recently filed suits alleging constitutional and civil rights 
violations against officials in Arizona and North Carolina. See Complaint, United States v. 
Maricopa Cnty., No. CV-12-00981-PHX-ROS, 2012 WL 1631747 (D. Ariz. May 10, 2012); 
Complaint, United States v. Johnson, No. 1:12-cv-01349 (M.D.N.C. Dec. 20, 2012). 
 331. Compare Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 372 (1971) (invalidating an Arizona law 
that restricted legal aliens’ access to benefits), with Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67 (1976) (holding 
that the federal government could deny benefits to classes of noncitizens even though states 
could not). The “suspect class” designation has precluded most subfederal discrimination 
against legal resident immigrants. Unlawfully present immigrants have not enjoyed the same 
level of protection at the subfederal level, but are afforded at least as much (if not more) judicial 
protection against subfederal discrimination than at the federal level. Cf. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 
202, 206−30 (1982) (holding that states cannot deny undocumented children equal access to 
primary and secondary education). 
 332. See, e.g., Graham, 403 U.S. at 371−72, 376 (finding alienage a suspect class, prompting 
strict scrutiny of two states’ discriminatory laws concerning economic benefits for legal 
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To be sure, protecting unlawful immigrants against subfederal 
discrimination may be more difficult under the Equal Protection 
Clause, as the Court has yet to recognize unlawful immigrants as a 
protected class.333 Meanwhile, equal protection claims premised on 
racial or ethnic discrimination may be too difficult to substantiate 
given the jurisprudential hurdle of proving a discriminatory intent.334 
It is in this spirit that some commentators favor an approach to 
preemption that will be more sensitive to, and perhaps compensate 
for, equal protection concerns.335 
The allure of an equal protection approach to preemption is 
twofold. First, the approach leverages the perception that subfederal 
policymakers are discriminating, or at least are reasonably feared to 
be discriminating. Second, for immigrant advocates, infusing the 
preemption doctrine with equal protection norms is attractive 
because it provides a basis for arguing that restrictionist measures 
should be preempted even while protectionist measures are not.336 
However, an equal protection approach to preemption carries its 
own problems, as some Justices made clear in Arizona. In a telling 
exchange during the opening moments of oral argument, Chief Justice 
Roberts interrupted Solicitor General Donald Verrilli to inquire: 
“Before you get into what the case is about, I’d like to clear up at the 
outset what it’s not about. No part of your argument has to do with 
racial or ethnic profiling, does it?”337 The Solicitor General relented, 
responding: “That’s correct.”338 And when the issue of race surfaced 
 
permanent residents); see also Takahashi v. Fish & Game Comm’n, 334 U.S. 410, 419−20 (1948) 
(finding state regulation limiting commercial fishing licenses to persons ineligible for citizenship 
to violate the Equal Protection Clause); Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33, 43 (1915) (finding state 
employment restrictions on immigrants to violate the Equal Protection Clause); Yick Wo v. 
Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 369−74 (1886) (finding Equal Protection to apply to non-citizens because 
the use of the term “person” in the Fourteenth Amendment should be read literally to include 
all people within the territory of the United States). 
 333. But cf. Plyler, 457 U.S. at 202−03 (offering somewhat more protection to 
undocumented children). 
 334. Indeed, this insight probably explains why the federal administration has favored 
preemption challenges over equal protection challenges in its legal assault on subfederal 
restrictionist laws. 
 335. See, e.g., Guttentag, supra note 329, at 1−2, 5 (claiming that federal law embodies anti-
discrimination norms); Margulies, supra note 19; Motomura, The Rights of Others, supra note 6, 
at 1731−38 (arguing that institutional preemption-based arguments have been more effective in 
court than individual equal protection arguments). 
 336. E.g., Guttentag, supra note 329, at 6; Motomura, The Rights of Others, supra note 6. 
 337. Transcript of Oral Argument at 34, Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492 (2012) 
(No. 11-182). 
 338. Id. 
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only minutes later in the Solicitor General’s comments, Justice Scalia 
was quick to remind the Solicitor General of his earlier commitment 
to what the case was not about.339 
These Justices’ rush to a doctrinal tourniquet seems rather self-
evident. If a doctrinal accommodation is warranted in the 
immigration context to account for rampant (though hidden) 
discriminatory intent, such accommodation should most naturally 
come in an equal protection challenge, not as a distorting variable in 
preemption analysis. Exactly how many thumbs on the scale in favor 
of preemption should the threat of subfederal discrimination yield? 
How would the threat of discrimination be proved; or, would the 
burden be on the subfederal government to disprove it?340 More 
generally, why would or should a court modify preemption doctrine 
instead of equal protection doctrine to accommodate concerns about 
discrimination? If the preemption doctrine is utilized to require 
anything less than the equal protection doctrine currently does, 
preemption may operate simply as an end-run around those hurdles. 
But if the shortfall is with the equal protection doctrine—either in 
general or as applied to immigration in particular—why not simply 
change that? 
These are tough and important questions. Yet they take me too far 
afield from my more immediate point: Immigrant advocates might do 
well to prefer equal protection’s scalpel over exclusivity’s 
sledgehammer. Excluding a subfederal role in enforcement will not 
necessarily rid immigration enforcement of discrimination; it simply 
accumulates potential for discrimination in the federal government. 
Though for the moment we may prefer to take our chances with 
federal enforcement, we need not look far for examples of executive 
enforcement policies alleged to violate civil liberties.341 Investing in a 
 
 339. Id. at 47. 
 340. Cf. Motomura, The Rights of Others, supra note 6, at 1743 (“An equal protection 
challenge would require proof of discriminatory intent, but a preemption challenge can 
persuade some judges based on reasonable possibility of discriminatory intent. One wonders if 
the [Hazleton district court] would have found preemption if the plaintiffs had not introduced so 
much evidence on race and ethnicity.”). 
 341. See e.g., Mohita Anand & Constantin Schreiber, The NSEERS Effect: A Decade of 
Racial Profiling, Fear, and Secrecy (Pa. State Law Rights Working Grp. 2012), available at 
http://law.psu.edu/_file/clinics/NSEERS_report.pdf. See generally KEVIN R. JOHNSON, THE 
HUDDLED MASSES MYTH: IMMIGRATION AND CIVIL RIGHTS (2004); David Cole, Enemy 
Aliens, 54 STAN. L. REV. 953 (2002) (reviewing harsh measures through immigration and other 
laws directed at Arab and Muslim noncitizens in the name of the “War on Terror”); Kevin R. 
Johnson, How Racial Profiling in America Became the Law of the Land: United States v. 
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federal monopoly over immigration enforcement dangerously leaves 
no meaningful checks on federal action, because under the plenary 
doctrine such checks may not readily come from the courts, and 
subfederal units will have no traction for dissenting action. An 
approach that insists on federal exclusivity in the name of civil 
liberties may thus have it backward. Again, recent subfederal 
resistance to the Executive’s Secure Communities program provides 
one example of the potential value in dissenting subfederal action 
against what many immigrant advocates perceive as executive 
overreaching.342 
This leads to a fourth, and final, point. In light of the subfederal 
restrictionist measures actually on the table, the unknown variable of 
an as-yet-to-be-determined congressional response may still present 
the more attractive option. But, for decades, the congressional trend 
has been to significantly tighten immigration control.343 Though there 
may be hope for directional change, prudence suggests investing such 
hope in the political process rather than in judicial doctrines that 
would leave those choices unchecked by both the courts and the 
subfederal governments. Such a state of affairs would surrender what 
little remains of the “double security” baked into our government 
structure.344 
To summarize, then, arguments for exceptionalism in immigration 
federalism may ultimately prove counterproductive to immigrants. At 
least a greater degree of reflection seems warranted given: (1) the 
expressed desire of some subfederal governments to afford more 
rights and protection than federal law requires or allows; (2) the 
absence of any clear direction on how the federal political balance 
 
Brigoni-Ponce and Whren v. United States and the Need for Truly Rebellious Lawyering, 98 
GEO. L.J. 1005 (2010); Ice Settles Case on Controversial Home Raids, CENTER FOR 
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS (Dec. 17, 2012), http://ccrjustice.org/newsroom/press-releases/ice-
settles-case-controversial-home-raids (reporting on class action settlement against ICE for 
controversial house raids). 
 342. See supra notes 308−09 and accompanying text (describing subfederal resistance to the 
Secure Communities program). 
 343. See, e.g., The Secure Fence Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-367, § 3, 120 Stat. 2638, 2639; 
REAL ID Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-13, 19 Stat. 231; Uniting and Strengthening America by 
Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT) 
Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272; Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant 
Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009; Antiterrorism and Effective 
Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214; see also Legomsky, The Making 
of United States Refugee Policy, supra note 4, at 677−80 (discussing the pre-1996 congressional 
trend). 
 344. THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, at 161 (James Madison) (Roy P. Fairfield ed., 1966). 
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over immigration will be struck; and (3) a Court that cannot be 
expected to provide any meaningful check on whatever those federal 
political choices end up being. 
CONCLUSION 
The political and judicial accommodations made for modern 
government have brought us a considerable distance from our 
original structure. That is mostly water under the bridge, and nothing I 
have said here is intended to return us to 1789. Still, however, 
immigration structuralism has founding principles in mind, not only 
because the Constitution requires it, but also because of the enduring 
values they serve. 
A generational project among immigration scholars has been to 
normalize constitutional immigration law. That is all that immigration 
structuralism sets out to do—nothing more, nothing less. More 
specifically, it counsels for shedding the immigration preemption 
doctrine of special methodological and substantive rules. These 
special rules are directed at leaving subfederal governments very little 
to do, but for that very reason, also come at the cost of removing a 
vital check on federal political choices. 
I am not blind to the challenges that immigration structuralism 
must overcome. For many skeptics, any abstract appeal of leaving a 
role for subfederal governments disassembles in the crucible of 
reality. But it is here, I caution, that the political question of what to 
do about immigration should not be made to distort the constitutional 
question of which institution has the power to do it. Waving the 
immigration-exceptionalism flag may help to win a battle or two in 
the subfederal revolution. Yet it may cost the war.345 
 
 
 345. For a similar expression, see Spiro, Demi-Sovereignties, supra note 174, at 173 (“The 
context demands innovative legal and political strategies in defense of the alien, one of which 
may be to concede lost battles with an eye to winning the war.”). 
